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In the early stages of the process of industry evolution, ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained and might pay
different wages to workers according to their expectations about the prospects for advancement offered by
each ﬁrm’s job ladder. This paper argues that, nevertheless, if the output market is competitive, the positive
predictions of the perfectly competitive model are still a good description of the long run outcome. If ﬁrms
maximize the discounted sum of constrained proﬁts, ﬁnancing expenditure out of retained earnings, proﬁts
are driven down to zero as the perfectly competitive model predicts. Ex ante identical ﬁrms may follow
different growth paths in which workers work for a lower entry-wage in ﬁrms expected to grow more. In the
steady state, however, workers performing the same job, in ex-ante identical ﬁrms, receive the same wage. I
explain when the long run outcome is efﬁcient, when it is not, and why ﬁrms that produce inefﬁciently might
drive the efﬁcient ones out of the market even when the steady state has the positive properties of a Walrasian
equilibrium. To some extent, it is not technological efﬁciency but workers’ self-fulﬁlling expectations about
their prospects for advancement within the ﬁrm that explains which ﬁrms have lower unit costs, grow more,
and dominate the market.
Key words: Industry Evolution - Market Selection Hypothesis - Production under Incomplete Markets -
Retained Earnings Dynamic - Self-Fulﬁlling Expectations - Internal Labor Markets
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation Numbers: D21, D52, D61, D84, D92, J411. INTRODUCTION
Economic theory predicts that in a market where many ﬁrms sell an homogeneous product, at least in the long
run, each ﬁrm produces the quantity that maximizes proﬁts and proﬁts vanish. Although most economists agree
with this description of the long run outcome of the process of industry evolution, much less consensus has been
achieve on what forces lead an industry to that state. The theory of industry equilibrium in competitive markets
relies on the existence of perfect markets for inputs and credit to explain why proﬁts are dissipated. Indeed, if there
is a complete set of perfectly competitive ﬁnancial markets, each ﬁrm maximizes its market value, the markets for
inputs are perfectly competitive, there are no turnover costs and there is either free entry or the technology displays
constant returns to scale then proﬁts are zero from the start and each ﬁrm produces at the proﬁt maximizing level.
In sharp contrast with these assumptions, however, the empirical evidence suggests that new ﬁrms are
ﬁnancially constrained and the labor market, rather than being in a Walrasian equilibrium from the start, is better
characterized by social institutions not considered in the theory of the ﬁrm under perfect competition.
Indeed, on the one hand, the problems of asymmetric information identiﬁed by authors like Stiglitz and Weiss
[13] as the main explanation for the failure of the credit market are important in the early stages of the process of
industry evolution. Consequently, ﬁnancing through retained earnings is the norm rather than the exception.1 The
lack of access to credit prevents ﬁrms from achieving their optimal size from the start and explains why it takes
time for proﬁts to be dissipated. On the other hand, workers tend to be attached to the same ﬁrm for long periods,
ﬁrms carry out most of the training of their employees and prefer to promote employees rather than recruiting new
workers. Using the term made popular by Doeringer and Piore [8], ﬁrms set up an internal labor market.
It is apparent that modern industries display many features that are not taken into account in the static model
but are key to understanding why industry evolution takes time and how wages evolve. Therefore, the standard
description of ﬁrm and industry behavior is at best the description of a steady state of some growth dynamics.
Economists like Alchian [1] and Friedman [10] recognized this a long time ago. Nelson and Winter [12, and
references therein] were the ﬁrst to provide a formal explanation of how such a steady state can be attained even
if no ﬁrm follows a proﬁt maximization rule. The key assumption in their work is that ﬁrms that make positive
proﬁts expand, those that make zero proﬁts do not change capacity while those that make losses contract and search
for new decision rules, a dynamic that can be motivated by the use of retained earnings to ﬁnance investment.
However, Blume and Easley [7] show that even though such retained earnings dynamic may explain why ﬁrms that
do not maximize proﬁts are driven out, it may not converge to a Walrasian equilibrium. In their model, capitalists
ﬁnance production out of retained earnings, so that ﬁrms with uniformly smaller proﬁts are driven out, and the
interior steady states of the retained earnings dynamic are competitive equilibria and are Pareto optimal. They
provide examples in which ﬁrms produce two goods operating different technologies and they show that if the
1 To quote Allen and Gale [3]: “Perhaps the most striking point [...] is that in all countries [US, UK, France and Germany] except Japan,
retained earnings are the most important source of funds. External ﬁnance is simply not that important” (p. 76)
1goods are sufﬁciently complementary, then the steady state of the retained earnings dynamic may be unstable.2
The work of Nelson and Winter and Blume and Easley, however, focuses on the role of the retained earnings
dynamic as a substitute for market completeness when the labor market is in a Walrasian equilibrium from the start.
In many industries, instead, the existence of training costs and ﬁrm speciﬁc abilities lead ﬁrms to set up internal
labor markets where wages exceed those of competing industries. This is typically the case for skill intensive
jobs at the top of the progression line. Since workers anticipate they may progress through the promotion line
and obtain those high wages in the future, intuitively, the better the prospects for advancement displayed by the
ﬁrm, ceteris paribus, the lower the worker’s reservation entry-wage is. This insight introduces a potentially self-
fulﬁlling aspect in the process of industry evolution. Indeed, since ﬁrms rely on internal funds, ﬁrms believed to
have better growth potential pay, ceteris paribus, lower wages, and have more revenue, end up promoting more
workers and producing more, fulﬁlling workers’ expectations. If ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth
paths, does the industry converge to a steady state? What are the efﬁciency properties of the steady state? Which
ﬁrms pay lower wages? Is there an unambiguous positive relationship between technological efﬁciency and growth
rates? These are some of the questions addressed in this work.
This paper argues that when ﬁrms ﬁnance expenditure out of retained earnings and the internal labor market
arises as a cost minimizing institution (due to ﬁrm speciﬁc abilities and costly training), the industry converges to
a steady state that is Walrasian-like in the sense that proﬁts are dissipated, ﬁrms do not face ﬁnancial constraints
and markets clear. However, this steady state need not efﬁcient. Indeed, along the transition, inefﬁcient ﬁrms may
display better growth prospects, pay lower entry-wages and grow more than the efﬁcient ones. Adjustment costs do
no play any role in my analysis because ﬁrms do not face a shortage in the internal supply of skilled workers along
the process of industry evolution. Instead, I focus on the role of workers’ expectations in shaping factor prices, an
aspect that has not been addressed yet in the literature of industry evolution towards a Walrasian equilibrium.
I use a partial equilibrium model of industry evolution with long live ﬁrms that operate a two-task technology
withconstantreturns andinﬁnitelymanyoverlappinggenerationsofworkers wholivefortwoperiodsandconsume
out of wages. A worker who performs the ﬁrst task when young develops high ability with positive probability.
Only high ability workers who undergo training can perform the second task when old. Training is costly for the
ﬁrm but is costless for the worker who is free to move after the training process has ended. A worker who does not
switch ﬁrms, is more productive in the second task than a worker trained by another ﬁrm. A key ingredient is that
there are always ﬁrms that are yet to train when others have ended their training process and so the former can save
the training cost by hiring workers trained by the latter. Firms compete for skilled workers a la Bertrand and so the
2 The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose ﬁrm 1’s technology displays constant returns to scale and that with 1 unit of input
at t it produces more of good 1 and less of good 2 at t +1than ﬁrm 2.W h e nﬁrm 1’s ﬁnancial capital exceeds its steady state level, total
output of good 1 increases and total output of good 2 decreases. If the goods are sufﬁciently complementary, the extra output of good 1 and
the corresponding reduction of good 2 reduces the market clearing price of good 1 so much that ﬁrm 1 suffers a large loss. In particular, ﬁrm
1’s retained earnings can fall below its steady state level, while the opposite holds for ﬁrm 2 which mainly produces good 2.T h i sc a u s e s
the opposite response in the next period, with ﬁrm 2 producing more of good 2 than in the steady state. When the goods are sufﬁciently
complementary, this cycle of proﬁts and loses produces cycles in the levels of ﬁnancial capital that do not damp out and allocative efﬁciency
fails. They also have an example with four ﬁrms where the equilibrium does not converge to a steady state and technological efﬁciency fails.
2skilled worker’s wage is his best outside offer. The higher the training cost is or the more general the skill is, the
higher is the ﬁrms’ willingness to pay for an externally trained worker and, therefore, the higher is his wage upon
promotion. When the latter exceeds his wage at home, his reservation entry-wage depends on the worker’s beliefs
about the ﬁrm’s promotion rate. Firms take output prices as given, cannot borrow and allocate their assets either to
ﬁnance production or to a risk free activity. As long as proﬁts are positive, ﬁrms ﬁnd optimal to fully allocate their
assets to ﬁnance production, driving prices down and pushing proﬁts to the steady state level.
I show, by means of an example, that ex-ante identical ﬁrms can follow different growth paths towards the
steady state. Ceteris paribus, ﬁrms expected to grow faster hire workers at a lower entry-wage and so technological
efﬁciency fails along the transition. However, technological efﬁciency does hold in the steady state since growth
rates are identical across ﬁrms. In the steady state, therefore, not only ﬁrms are not ﬁnancially constrained and
make zero proﬁts but also workers who carry out identical jobs receive the same wage regardless of the ﬁrm that
hires them and the labor markets clears as if it were in a Walrasian equilibrium. Allocative efﬁciency, instead,
holds in the steady state if and only if the training cost is so low or the ability so ﬁrm speciﬁc that the skilled
worker’s wage equals his wage at home and so entry-wages are identical across productive activities. Otherwise,
too little is produced compared to the efﬁcient allocation of resources. The failure of technological and allocative
efﬁciency is due both to the absence of a perfect credit market as well as the impossibility of paying old workers
their opportunity cost out of the industry.
I also consider the case of ﬁrms with different technologies. Although economists long time ago recognized
that ﬁrms with lower costs grow more, it is usually assumed that cost differentials stem from technological factors.
A reason that has been overlooked is that, ceteris paribus, those ﬁrms believed to display better growth prospects
can hire workers at a lower wage. Since the workers’ willingness to work for a lower entry-wage can more than
compensate for the disadvantage introduced by an inefﬁcient technology, even ﬁrms that produce inefﬁciently may
end up dominating a market if workers believe they display sufﬁciently better prospects than the efﬁcient ones. Can
it happen in an equilibrium converging to a Walrasian-like state? I construct an example in which proﬁts vanish,
worker’s expectations are fulﬁlled and, nevertheless, inefﬁcient ﬁrms grow more and dominate the market in terms
of market share. If at the early stages of the process of industry evolution workers are optimistic enough about
prospects for advancement offered by the ﬁrms that produce inefﬁciently, almost a l lw o r k e r se n du pe m p l o y e db y
inefﬁcient ﬁrms in the long run. Therefore, ﬁrms do not face ﬁnancial constraints and make zero proﬁts, markets
clear and almost all workers performing the same job receive the same wage, as in a Walrasian equilibrium.
I ns e c t i o n2Id e ﬁne the game of imperfect information played by the ﬁrms and the inﬁnite generations
of workers for a ﬁxed sequence of output prices. I characterize the equilibrium path of its Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) and prove existence in sections 3 and 4, respectively. In section 5, I deﬁne an Industry
Equilibrium (IE) as a PBE where output prices clear the market. In section 6 and 7, I show there is an IE in which
ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow identical growth paths and I discuss the efﬁciency properties of the IE for the case
of ex-ante identical and heterogeneous ﬁrms, respectively. Proofs are in the Appendix.
32. THE MODEL
At date zero, the industry adopts a new technology based in two tasks that use only labor as input. If q1 and q2
denote the level at which the two tasks are performed, then the output level, q,i sg i v e nb y
q = qα
1 · q1−α
2 where 0 <α<1.
Task 1requires a skillthatis not industryspeciﬁc. Ifl isthenumberof workersemployedintask1,t h e nq1 (l)=l.3
Every worker develops a new ability while performing the ﬁrst task. Ability is a random variable that takes only
two values: high or low; ability turns out to be high with probability λ ∈ (0,1). Only high ability workers who
have received training develop an industry speciﬁc skill necessary to perform the second task. A ﬁrm can ﬁnd a
worker who is suitable to perform the second task at t +1from one of two sources:4
1. The employees that performed task 1 in the ﬁrm at t a n dd e v e l o p e dh i g ha b i l i t y . 5 They can be trained at the
beginning of t +1 ,a tau n i tc o s to fc, to perform task 2 during t +1 .I ft h eﬁrm hires them, it is said to promote
workers internally. If every worker performing task 2 has been promoted internally, the ﬁrm is said to have a closed
internal labor market with one entry port.
2. The employees that performed task 1 in other ﬁrms in the industry at t. If one of these workers decides to move
after being trained, he does not need additional training to perform the second task in his new job. However, he is
not as productive as a skilled employee who worked in the same ﬁrm when young: e skilled workers that switch
ﬁrms are as productive as e
1+θ,w i t hθ>0, skilled employees who are promoted internally. Larger values of θ
correspond to greater ﬁrm speciﬁcity of the skill. A ﬁrm that employs them is said to hire workers externally.
If s and e are the number of internally promoted and externally hired workers, respectively, then q2 (s,e)=
s + e
1+θ denotes the level of activity of the second task. A ﬁrm that employs (l,s,e) workers at date t, obtains
q(l,s,e;α) ≡ q1 (l)
α · q2 (s,e)
1−α units of output at t +1 .
2.1 Workers
Every period t ≥ 0, a new generation of workers, who live for two periods, enters the labor force. Workers
do not consume the good produced by this industry. They only face uncertainty about their ability and, therefore,
about their wage when old. Workers have preferences over random bundles of the numeraire that display risk
neutrality and discount the future at rate 0 <β<1. A worker who does not work in this industry can work at
home with expected lifetime utility w1 + β · w2, when young, and w2 ≥ w1 > 0, when old. Without loss of
generality, one may think that w1 and w2 are the productivities of a young and an old worker in the production of
the numeraire. Since workers cannot borrow, they consume out of wages. I assume c
θ is large relatively to w1.
Assumption AW: w1, w2, β,a n dc
θ are such that w2 < c





3 It would be more appropriate to say that l is the measure of workers hired by the ﬁrm. The same applies to all other types of labor.
4 There is a third possibility. A ﬁrm could screen a worker who did the ﬁrst task in other industry when young, to learn whether he
has high ability or not. I assume screening costs are prohibitively high. See Doeringer and Piore [8, p. 31] for arguments supporting this
assumption.
5 Doeringer and Piore emphasize this point [8, p. 31].
42.2 Efﬁcient Allocations
The demand for the good, D(p), has standard properties.
AssumptionAD:D : <+ → <+ iscontinuousandstrictlydecreasingforallpsuchthatD(p) > 0, lim
p→∞D(p)=0












β is the gross rate of return on a risk free investment opportunity.7
Since this is a partial equilibrium model, to make efﬁciency judgments one has to make some additional
assumptions. I assume that consumer surplus is an adequate measure of welfare and 1
r is the socially optimal
discount rate. Since w1 and w2 are the productivities of young and old workers out of this industry, they measure
the social cost of allocating workers to this industry. At any t ≥ 0, there are only two relevant types of labor for
the planner: the young workers who perform task 1 and the old workers who performed task 1 in this industry
when young. An industry is technologically efﬁcient if more output cannot be produced using the same amount of
every input and strictly less of one of them. As usual, the set of efﬁcient allocations is the solution to the following
Social Planner’s problem where CS(q) ≡
R q















− w1 · lt − (w2 + c) · st
¤
s.t. st ≤ λ · lt−1 (1)








and Q∗ (α)=D(p∗ (α)). Lemma 2.1 characterizes the set of efﬁcient
allocations for those parameters such that in the solution to (1) the constraint does not bind.9
Lemma 2.1 If α> w1
w1+λ·(w2+c) then Q∗ (α) is the allocative efﬁcient level of output while the allocative efﬁcient


















as given, and are endowed with a0 > 0 units of the numeraire and λ · l−1 ≥ 1−α
w2+c · a0 trainees.10 The distribution
of workers across ﬁrms satisﬁes a law of large numbers at each date: if ﬁrm i employs l workers in task 1 at date
t, a fraction λ of these workers develops high ability.11 Firms cannot borrow. At every t ≥ 0, each ﬁrm collects
earnings and decides how much of its assets to invest in an alternative activity with gross rate of return r>1 and
what part to allocate as ﬁnancial capital to hire inputs.12 Figure 1 illustrates the timing of decisions.






to workers who perform the ﬁrst and
second task, respectively, can make positive proﬁts. This assumption will guarantee that equilibrium output is not zero.
7 To simplify the analysis I do not consider the case in which β =
1
r even though all the results in this paper extend to that case.
8 A standard justiﬁcation is that agents who consume the good produced in this industry have quasilinear preferences.
9 This is the appropriate benchmark because in all the equilibria I analyze later, the constraint does not bind either.
10 One can think that ﬁrms have been operating for a while, perhaps using another technology based only in task 1, and know the ability
of those workers it employed before.
11 Since independence has no role in this model, the argument in Feldman and Gilles [9] implies that there exists a distribution of workers
for which the law of large numbers holds in every Borel set.
12 For the rest of the paper, I take this alternative activity as lending at the interest rate r.
5Figure 1. Timing of decisions
2.4 The hiring process
In principle, there is a large set of labor contracts a ﬁrm could offer to its workers. For example, one could
imagine a contract in which the ﬁrm assigns a young worker to task 1, pays him a certain wage at date t and
promises future wages contingent on being promoted or not. One could even think of a contract where the ﬁrm
detailsthepromotionrateatt+1, asinMalcomson[11]. However, manycontractslike thesearenotimplementable
because of a lack of commitment by the workers or the ﬁrm. Therefore, I restrict the analysis to spot contracts.
Assumption AC: Firms can neither commit to a wage in the event a worker is promoted nor to a promotion rate.
At date t ≥ 0 every ﬁrm faces an inﬁnite supply of young workers each of whom is contacted by just one ﬁrm.
If training were completely ﬁrm speciﬁc, one would expect the wage of a promoted worker to be w2 because no
other ﬁrm in this industry would be willing to hire such worker. In this model, however, the second task can be
performed by workers hired internally or externally. Although internally promoted workers are more productive
than the externally trained ones, a ﬁrm who hires externally avoids the training cost c. Evidently, for trained
workers to have an outside opportunity within the industry it is necessary that there be a ﬁrm that is yet to train
when his training process has ended. This seems very realistic. To capture this idea, I assume that between dates
t and t +1ﬁrms carry out the training process sequentially. Si and Di denote the set of ﬁrms that train workers
right before and after ﬁrm i does it. Of course, Si ∩ Di = ∅. For simplicity, I also assume #Si =# Di = N.
The interaction between the ﬁrms and the successive generations of workers deﬁne an extensive game Γ(P).
At every date t ≥ 0,t h eg a m eΓ(P) consists of three stages:
¥ 1st stage: Firms, simultaneously, decide the number of vacancies they open for the ﬁrst task (li,t) and externally
trained workers (ei,t), the wage offers associated with the ﬁrst task (wi,t), internal promotions (vi,t) and externally
trained workers (ve
i,t), the ﬁnancial capital (mi,t) and the bond holdings (bi,t). That is, every ﬁrm i ∈ I chooses a
vector di,t =
³





wi,t · li,t + ve
i,t · ei,t = mi,t (2)
Condition (2) limits the vacancies for young workers and externally trained workers to what ﬁrm i can ﬁnance at
the announced wages using all its ﬁnancial capital. In addition, ﬁrm i’s ﬁnancial capital and bond holdings must
be non-negative and add up to the ﬁrm’s assets (ai,t),
(mi,t,b i,t) ∈ <2
+ (3)
mi,t + bi,t = ai,t (4)
6¥ 2nd stage: Young workers, simultaneously, decide whether to accept (A) or reject (R) employment.
ALLOCATION OF 2
ND TASK JOB OFFERS:F i r m i’s skilled workers get offers only from ﬁrms in Di and ﬁrm i
offers are received only by skilled workers of ﬁrms in Si. A worker receives at most one offer from each ﬁrm. If
ﬁrm j ∈ Di announces ej,t vacancies for externally trained workers, at most that number of workers trained by
ﬁrms in Sj gets an offer. Let b ve





. Each worker trained by ﬁrm i
observes a realization of b ve
j,t for each j ∈ Di with the interpretation that those who observe ve
j,t are being offered
aj o bi nﬁrm j at wage ve
j,t and those who observe 0 not.
Let si,t−1 be the number of workers that were offered training at t−1 andb li,t−1,b si,t−1 and b ei,t−1 be the number
who accepted employment at t − 1 in ﬁrm i.T h e n , 13
³
b li,t−1,b si,t−1,b ei,t−1
´
≤ (li,t−1,s i,t−1,e i,t−1),( 5 )
where b li,−1 = l−1 and b si,−1 = b ei,−1 =0 . Because the number of workers who are offered training cannot exceed
the number of high ability workers, the ﬁrm faces the following “internal labor market” constraint at t:
0 ≤ si,t ≤ λ ·b li,t−1.( 6 )
If si,t <λ · b li,t−1,t h eﬁrm decides at random who is offered training because, from its point of view, high
ability workers are homogeneous. Since internal promotions must be ﬁnanced with the money left after ﬁnancing
















where the second line re￿ ects that young workers who accepted employment in a ﬁrm that produced zero at t − 1
did not develop any ability because they did not perform the ﬁrst task.
¥ 3rd stage: Each old worker trained by ﬁrm i observes a random draw of b ve
j,t for each j ∈ Di and decides whether
to stay (choose i),m o v et os o m eﬁrm j ∈ Di that made him an offer or work at home (choose o).
Finally, ﬁrm i’s assets at date t +1are
ai,t+1 ≡ pt · q
³




mi,t − c · si,t − wi,t ·b li,t − vi,t · b si,t − ve
i,t · b ei,t
i
+ r · bi,t (8)
Implicit in condition (8) is that even though the ﬁnancial capital the ﬁrm would use to pay the wage of those
workers that reject employment cannot be invested in bonds, it can be stored and spent the following period.
13 For any x,y ∈ <
n
+, x ≥ y if xk ≥ yk for k =1 ,...,n.
14 Since training is costless for the worker, I assume every worker who is offered training accepts and, therefore, I use si,t to denote also
the number of workers who accept training.
72.4.1 Formal description of the extensive form game Γ(P).
For each t ≥ 0, i ∈ I, di,t ∈ <7
+ and
³
si,t,b li,t,b si,t,b ei,t
´
∈ <4
+,d e ﬁne hi,t ≡
³








the set of play paths. A typical element of H∞ is a sequence h =( h0,h 1,...,h t,...) where ht = {hi,t}i∈I for
every t ≥ 0. For each h ∈ H∞, ht
i (h) ≡ (hi,0,h i,1,...,h i,t−1) denotes the partial history of ﬁrm i up to date t,
ht (h) ≡ (h0,h 1,...,h t−1) denotes the partial history of the game up to date t, ht
i (h) ≡
³
hi,0,h i,1,...,h i,t−1,d 0
i,t
´
is ﬁrm i’s partial history up to date t including ﬁrm i’s actions at t,a n dht (h) ≡ (h0,h 1,...,h t−1,d 0








, is the partial history of the game up to date t including every ﬁrm’s actions at t. Ht
i is the
set of partial histories of ﬁrm i up to date t, Ht is the set of partial histories up to date t and Ht is the set of partial
histories up to date t including the actions of ﬁrms at t.
At date t ≥ 0, each ﬁrm recalls its own past actions and observes the number of workers who accepted















The initial assets of ﬁrm i are ai,0 (h)=a0 and for every t ≥ 0, ﬁrm i’s assets at t +1are
ai,t+1 (h) ≡ pt·qi,t (h)+
h
mi,t (h) − c · si,t (h) − wi,t (h) ·b li,t (h) − vi,t (h) · b si,t (h) − ve




where qi,t (h) ≡ q
³




ai,t(h) is ﬁrm i’s production level and rate of














= Ai,t (h) if ht
i (h)=xt
i. Ai,t = ∪h∈H∞Ai,t (h) is the set of actions of ﬁrm i at t.




xt ∈ Ht : ∃h ∈ H∞ such that ht (h)=xt and wi,t (h)=w
o
.
The function χi,t (h) indicates whether the number of trainees in ﬁrm i at date t on path h is limited by its
assets (χi,t (h)=0 ) or by its internal supply of high ability workers (χi,t (h)=1 ).15 Let χi
t (h) be the vector
in <N
+ with coordinates χi
jn,t (h), jn ∈ Di.F o r ﬁxed t ≥ 0, h ∈ H∞ and i ∈ I, b vi
t (h) is the random vector
in <N
+ with coordinates b ve
jn,t (h), jn ∈ Di, and probability distribution ηi,t (h). Each worker trained by ﬁrm






+ and a random draw of b vi








15 That is, χi,t (h)=0if
mi,t(h)−wi,t(h)·li,t(h)
vi,t(h)+c <λ·e li,t−1 (h) and χi,t (h)=1otherwise.
82.4.2 Strategies
Firm i’s strategy is a sequence fi ≡ {fi,t}
∞
t=0 where fi,t : Ht











ﬁrm i’s set of pure strategies.








i,t : <+ → {A,R} is his response when young after being offered w by ﬁrm i and σ2
i,t+1 : <2·N+1
+ → Di∪{i,o}
is his response when old after being trained by ﬁrm i and observing vi,t (h). Wi,t is the set of strategies of the








t=0Wi,t is the collection of strategies the inﬁnite generations
of workers play against ﬁrm i when all workers of a given generation play the same strategy against ﬁrm i.
Ap r o ﬁle of strategies γ is a collection {fi,σi}i∈I such that (fi,σi) ∈ Fi × Wi for every i ∈ I. γ−i and γ0
−i
are the collections {σi,f j,σj}j∈I,j6=i and {fi,f j,σj}j∈I,j6=i, respectively. For a ﬁxed proﬁle γ, h∗ (γ) ∈ H∞ and
h∗ (x,γ) ∈ H∞ denote the path of play and the path of play after partial history x ∈ Ht ∪ Ht, respectively.
2.4.3 Payoffs, beliefs and equilibrium
At date t, an old worker, who underwent training in ﬁrm i and observes a realization of vi,t (h), can stay in ﬁrm
i and obtain wage vi,t,o rj o i nﬁrm j ∈ Di and receive wage b ve










vi,t (h) if σ2
i,t (vi,t (h)) = i.
b ve
j,t (h) if σ2
i,t (vi,t (h)) = j ∈ Di.
w2 otherwise.
which is independent of both the history of the game and the other players’ strategies. The expected payoff of an















The payoff of ﬁrms and young workers, instead, does depend on the history up to that date. Therefore, one
needs to specify their beliefs about the history of the game conditional on their information up to that date.
Let It and I1
t be the sets of all information sets of ﬁrms and young workers at date t, respectively. I is the
set of all information sets of ﬁrms and young workers. Since each ξ ∈ I is a countable product of rectangles in
the Euclidean space, in order to deﬁne beliefs one needs to deﬁne an appropriate measurable structure. Let F (ξ)
be the σ-algebra generated by the elements of ξ and (ξ,F (ξ)) be a measurable space. A system of beliefs is a
collection Ψ ≡ {Ψξ,ξ∈ I} such that for every ξ ∈ I, Ψξ : F (ξ)7→[0,1] is a probability measure on (ξ,F (ξ)).
Deﬁnition 2.1 A system of beliefs Ψ is consistent with a proﬁle of strategies γ if the following conditions hold





for some i ∈ I and t ≥ 0, then Ψξ (E)=1if ht (h∗) ∈ E and Ψξ (E)=0otherwise






for some i ∈ I and t ≥ 0,t h e nΨξ (E)=1if ht (h∗) ∈ E and Ψξ (E)=0otherwise.
Remark 1: Deﬁning an appropriate ﬁltration on the measurable space (H∞,H∞),w h e r eH∞ denotes the
Borel sets of H∞, one can show that conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent to requiring that the system of beliefs Ψ
satisﬁes Bayes’ rule whenever possible.






























Since each young worker born at t contacted by ﬁrm i observes only ﬁrm i’s wage offer, the probability of
being promoted the following period depends on the number of young workers who accept employment in ﬁrm i
at date t. Hence, his payoff after partial history xt ∈ Ht is:
Ui,t (b σi,t,γ)(xt) ≡
(















i,t (wi,t (h0)) = A
w1 + β · w2 otherwise




. His expected payoff at I1
i,t (w) is EΨIi,t(w) [Ui,t (b σi,t,γ)].
Finally, I deﬁne the equilibrium concept for the game of imperfect but complete information Γ(P).
Deﬁnition 2.2 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of Γ(P) is a proﬁle of strategies γ = {fi,σi}i∈I and a












(vi,t (h)) for all e σi,t ∈ Wt.
2. EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] ≥ EΨI1
















for all e fi ∈ Fi.
4. Ψ is consistent with γ.
3. EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION
In this section I characterize the equilibrium wages, vacancies and ﬁnancial capital. I begin providing a version
of the one-stage deviation property for Γ(P). In section 3.1, I show that skilled workers are paid their best outside
offer. In particular, when no worker changes ﬁrms after the training process has ended, competition drives the
skilled workers’ wage (weakly) above c
θ,t h ew a g et h a tm a k e saﬁrm indifferent between promoting internally and
hiring a worker trained by another ﬁrm. In section 3.2, I provide a mild condition on beliefs under which young
workers obtain their reservation lifetime utility and explain why this condition implies that ﬁrms that promote a
larger fraction of their workers pay, ceteris paribus, lower entry-wages. In section 3.3, I solve for the vacancies
opened by each ﬁrm and the associated sequences of entry-wages and growth rates in an equilibrium in which
workers get their reservation lifetime utility and ﬁrms offer the same wage to externally trained workers.
The equilibrium path of the game Γ(P) satisﬁes a strong version of the one-stage deviation property: if a ﬁrm
has a short run gain at τ, then it cannot promote si,τ+1 (h∗) workers the following period. Otherwise the ﬁrm could
continue with the same hiring policy it chooses on h∗ and reinvest the additional assets in bonds forever, increasing
its payoff.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose (γ,Ψ) is a PBE, i ∈ I and τ ≥ 0. Then Ri,τ (h) ≤ Ri,τ (h∗) for any h ∈ H∞ such




103.1 The equilibrium wages of skilled workers.
Suppose (γ,Ψ) is a PBE of Γ(P) and h∗ is the equilibrium path. Proposition 3.2 (i) argues that the wage offer
made by a ﬁrm where some workers accept an internal promotion must be at least what those workers could make
at home. In Proposition 3.2 (ii) I show that if every worker trained by ﬁrm i accepts an internal promotion, then
ﬁrm i’s skilled workers are paid their best outside offer. That is, the wage of skilled workers matches either what
they can make at home or the offer of some ﬁrm j, that is ve
j,t (h∗)=vi,t (h∗) > w2;o t h e r w i s eﬁrm i could offer
a slightly lower wage to the workers it trains and increase its earnings.
Proposition 3.2 If b si,t (h∗) > 0,t h e n
i. vi,t (h∗) ≥ w2.
ii. If b si,t (h∗)=si,t (h∗) and vi,t (h∗) > w2,t h e nvi,t (h∗)=ve
j,t (h∗) for some j ∈ Di.
Trivially, Proposition 3.2 (i) implies that when w2 ≥ c
θ,a n yﬁrm that promotes workers internally offers at least
c
θ. Proposition 3.3 shows that if competition for skilled workers drives the wage of internally promoted workers
above w2 and ﬁrms retain every worker they train, the same conclusion holds when c
θ > w2. To see why, notice
that since the marginal rate of technical substitution between internally and externally trained workers is 1
1+θ, ﬁrms
are indifferent between the two factors if the wage is c
θ. If the lowest wage offered to internally promoted workers
in the industry were smaller than c
θ,s o m eﬁrm i would pay them a wage so close to that wage that every ﬁrm
j ∈ Di would strictly prefer to hire (1 + θ) workers trained by ﬁrm i at a wage slightly above vi,t (h∗) rather
than promoting a worker internally. Moreover, by Proposition 3.2 (ii), some ﬁrm j ∈ Di would announce a wage
ve
j,t (h∗)=vi,t (h∗). If workers trained by ﬁrm i did not have any outside offer that matches ﬁrm i’s offer, ﬁrm
i could proﬁtably deviate by lowering its wage offer to internally promoted workers. If, instead, some workers
trained by ﬁrm i rejected ﬁrm j’s offer, ﬁrm j could proﬁtable deviate by raising its wage offer slightly, covering
every external vacancy it offers to workers trained by ﬁrm i and reducing its internal promotions.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose c
θ > w2.I f b si,t (h∗)=si,t (h∗) > 0 and vi,t (h∗) > w2 for every i ∈ I,t h e n
vi,t (h∗) ≥ c
θ for every i ∈ I.
Since old workers can obtain w2 at home and ﬁrms are indifferent between internal promotions and externally
trained workers at wage c
θ, intuition suggests that competition for trained workers would drive their best outside





. This observation and Proposition 3.3 raises the interest for a particular class of PBE.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with Symmetric Outside Offers (PBESO) is a PBE (γ,Ψ)
such that ve
i,t (h∗)=ve
j,t (h∗) for every i,j ∈ I. A *PBESO is a PBESO with ve
i,t (h∗)=v∗ and
EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] = w1 + β · w2 for every i ∈ I.
3.2 Entry wages and Prospects for Advancement
In this section I analyze how the entry-wage relates to the ﬁrm’s promotion policy along the equilibrium path
of a PBE. Under a mild condition on beliefs, In Proposition 3.4 I show that young workers get their reservation
lifetime utility. In Proposition 3.5 I argue that when the skilled workers’ wage is at least v∗ and young workers
11obtain their reservation lifetime utility, assumption AW sufﬁces to rule out the possibility of a shortage in the
internal pool of high ability workers . Later, I show that ﬁrms that promote a larger fraction of their workers can
hire, ceteris paribus, workers at a lower entry wage , i.e. they display better prospects for advancement.
Since ﬁrms have no incentive to pay young workers more than what is necessary to induce them to accept
employment, intuition suggests that the equilibrium entry-wage should be the lowest wage that keeps them
indifferent between his two options. A sufﬁcient condition for this result is that the set of wage offers that are
strictly preferred to working at home is an open set, a condition that is always satisﬁed when w2 ≥ c
θ and
vi,t (h)=ve
j,t (h)=w2 for every j ∈ Si and h ∈ H∞ because in that case EΨI1
i,t(w) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] = w + β · w2.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose
n
w ∈ <+ : EΨI1
i,t(w) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] > w1 + β · w2
o
is anopenset. Ifb li,t (h∗) > 0,t h e n
EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] = w1 + β · w2.
Since in the early stages of the evolution of an industry ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained, those that pay lower
wages produce more and obtain more revenue to ﬁnance expansion. In order to explain the outcome of industry
evolution it is important, therefore, to identify what enables one ﬁrm to hire workers at a lower wage than another.
Insofar worker’s abilities are, at least to some degree, ﬁrm speciﬁc and developed by on-the-job training, one would
expect that a young worker’s entry-wage depends not only on his opportunity cost and future wages, but also on
other factors such as his beliefs about the opportunities for promotion within the ﬁrm. For the moment, I will be
rather vague and call all those relevant factors “the prospects for advancement” displayed by the ﬁrm.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A worker believes that ﬁrm i displays better prospect for advancement than ﬁrm j if he is willing
to work in ﬁrm i at a lower wage than in ﬁrm j.
Consider a young worker who receives a wage offer w, believes the probability of being promoted is z and his
wage upon promotion will be v∗. Then his lifetime expected utility is w + β · [z · (v∗ − w2)+w2] if he joins the
ﬁrm or w1 + β · w2 if he works at home. Let w(z,v∗) be his reservation entry-wage, t h ew a g ew h i c hm a k e sh i m
indifferent between accepting a job at date t or not. It is the unique w which solves
w + β · [z · (v∗ − w2)+w2]=w1 + β · w2 ⇔ w(z,v∗)=w1 − β · z · (v∗ − w2)
What makes a worker believe one ﬁrm displays better prospects for advancement than another? Lemma 3.1
shows that, ceteris paribus,o n eﬁrm displays better prospects for advancement than another at date t i fa n do n l yi f
the worker expects the former will promote a larger fraction of its employees than the latter at t +1 .
Lemma 3.1 Suppose EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] = EΨI1
j,t(wj,t(h∗)) [Uj,t (σj,t,γ)] = w1+β ·w2.I fvi,t+1 (h∗)=






, ﬁrm i displays better prospects for advancement at





There are at least two factors that could limit the growth of ﬁrms along the process of industry evolution. First,
ﬁrms might not achieve their optimal size immediately because they do not have enough ﬁnancial capital to ﬁnance
expansion. This is represented by the ﬁnancial capital constraints (2) and (7). Second, ﬁrms may face a shortage in
12their internal labor market. That is, even if ﬁnancial capital were available to promote more workers, the internal
pool might not contain as many high ability candidates as workers theﬁrm would like to hire. This is constraint (6).
In principle, any of these constraints may be binding during the process of industry evolution. In Proposition 3.5,
however, I show that assumption AW rules out this second possibility along the equilibrium path. Indeed, since a
young worker hired by ﬁrm i at date t believes his probability of being trained the following period is
si,t+1(h∗)
e li,t(h∗) ,
the internal labor market constraint does not bind on h∗ provided young workers are paid their reservation entry
wage and vi,t+1 (h∗) ≥ v∗ upon promotion. Otherwise, assumption AW implies his reservation entry-wage is zero
which would contradict the existence of a best response for ﬁrm i.
Proposition 3.5 Suppose AW & EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] = w1+βw2.I fvi,t+1 (h∗) ≥ v∗ then
si,t+1(h∗)
e li,t(h∗) <λ .
3.3 The evolution of entry-wages in a *PBESO.
In this section I characterize the vacancies and entry-wages along the equilibrium path of a *PBESO where
skilled workers are paid v∗. I begin with a result I use in Proposition 3.6 (iv) to characterize the relationship
between entry-wages and the growth rate of ﬁnancial capital.
Lemma 3.2 For any g ≥ 0, the equation w = w1 − β · 1−αi
αi · w
v∗+c · g · (v∗ − w2) has a unique solution
ω : <+ × (0,1) 7→ [0,w1] given by ω(g,αi)=
αi·(v∗+c)·w1
αi·(v∗+c)+(1−αi)·β·(v∗−w2)·g.I f v∗ > w2, the function ω is
continuous and strictly decreasing in g. If AW holds, 1−αi
αi ·
ω(g,αi)
v∗+c · g ≤ λ for any g ≥ 0.
In Proposition 3.6 (i) I prove that if wage offers leave young workers indifferent between accepting or rejecting





. In Proposition 3.6 (ii) I show that when v∗ = c
θ,o l d
workers do not change ﬁrms after the training process has ended. Otherwise, since training is costly and ﬁrms are
indifferent between promoting internally and hiring externally at wage c
θ,aﬁrm that loses some trained workers
w o u l dh a v eap r o ﬁtable deviation. Indeed, that ﬁrm could open exactly as many vacancies for externally trained
workers as it needs to produce qi,t (h∗) and raise slightly its wage offer to every high ability worker so that those
vacancies would be covered and no internally promoted worker would leave after the training process has ended.
Sincethewageincreasecouldbearbitrarilysmall, theincreaseinthewagebillwouldbemorethancompensatedby
thereductionintrainingcostsand thefreedﬁnancial capitalcouldbe investedinbonds. Proposition3.6(iii) applies
Proposition 3.1 to argue that if (6) does not bind at t and t +1on h∗,t h eﬁrm hires workers, at wages wi,t (h∗)
and v∗, to maximize next period sales revenue subject to a ﬁnancial constraint. To understand the intuition, notice
that if the ﬁrm were to deviate from this criterion, it would have fewer assets the following period. Since the ﬁrm
wants to maximize the discounted sum of its assets and the production function is concave, this deviation could
only make sense if it relaxes constraint (6), a possibility that is ruled out by hypothesis. This result together with
Proposition 3.5 and assumption AW allows me to write the promotion rate and the young workers’ entry-wage as
a function of the ﬁnancial capital growth rate. Indeed, since
h





pt · lα · s1−α s.t. wi,t (h∗) · l +( v∗ + c) · s = mi,t (h∗) (10)
thenb li,t (h∗)= αi







13Proposition 3.6 (iii) establishes that wi,t (h∗) solves









· (v∗ − w2) (11)
Proposition 3.6 Suppose (γ,Ψ) is a PBE with vi,t (h∗)=ve
i,t (h∗)=v∗ and EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] =







ii. If v∗ = c
θ,t h e nb ei,t (h∗)=0 .
iii. If
si,τ(h∗)
e li,τ−1(h∗) <λfor τ ∈ {t,t +1 }, then li,t (h∗)= αi
wi,t(h∗) · mi,t (h∗) and si,t (h∗)=
(1−αi)
v∗+c · mi,t (h∗).
iv. If
si,τ(h∗)







of ﬁnancial capital growth rates and this is the issue I focus on for the reminder of this section. There are two
levels of the reservation entry-wage that are key: the reservation entry-wage associated with an stationary level of
ﬁnancial capital, ω(1,α i), and the reservation entry-wage associated with a growth rate of r, ω(r,αi). For each
of these wages, one can deﬁne the output price so that the ﬁrm’s rate of return is r, i.e. the output price which is
equal to the ﬁrm’s marginal cost.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let ps (αi) ≡ r
q(ω(1,αi),αi) and pr (αi) ≡ r
q(ω(r,αi),αi).
Remark 2: Since ω(1,α i) >ω(r,αi) when v∗ > w2,t h e nps (αi) >p r (αi) if v∗ > w2 and ps (αi)=pr (αi)=
p∗ (αi) if v∗ = w2 .
Suppose at t +1ﬁrm i fully reinvests its earnings from sales, that is
mi,t+1(h∗)
mi,t(h∗) = pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i),a n d
young workers get their reservation utility. Then, the entry-wage, wi,t (h∗), solves the following equation in w:






· pt · q(w,αi) · (v∗ − w2) (12)
Lemma 3.3 There exists a unique ωH : <+ × (0,1) → [0,w1] that solves (12). If v∗ > w2, the function
ωH (p,αi) is continuous and strictly decreasing in p.
In the presence of ﬁnancial constraints and no ﬁxed costs, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the early stages
of the process of industry evolution are characterized by a high output price and positive proﬁts. This induces some
ﬁrms to fully reinvest their earnings, driving down the output price until proﬁts vanish. It is also natural to think
the industry eventually converges to a steady state where ﬁnancial capital stays constant and every ﬁrm makes
zero proﬁts. If this conjecture is correct and ﬁrms are ex-ante identical, Proposition 3.6 implies that the young
workers’ wage and the output price converge to ω(1,α i) and ps (αi), respectively. The rate of return of ﬁrms that
fully reinvest earnings along the transition to the steady state is bounded above by pt · q
¡
ωH (pt,α i),α i
¢
.F o r
proﬁts to be positive along the transition, therefore, it is necessary that pt · q
¡
ωH (pt,α i),α i
¢
>ror equivalently
pt >p r (αi). Thus, it seems natural to restrict the search to sequences of prices in the set
Σ = {P ∈ <∞ : ∃ Ts such that ∀i ∈ I, pt >p r (αi) if t<T s and pt = ps (αi) if t ≥ Ts}
14Let ωL (p,α) be the unique w solving q(w,α)=r
p. In Proposition 3.7 I show that for any P ∈ Σ the
equilibrium path of a *PBESO where ﬁrm i’s skilled workers are paid v∗ displays the following property: if τ is the
ﬁrst time ﬁrm i’s entry-wage, wi,t (h∗), differs from ωH (pt,α i), then it must be strictly greater than ωH (pτ,α i)
at that date; furthermore, ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are zero at any date following τ,i . e . wi,t (h∗)=ωL (pt,α i) for all
t ≥ τ. Since the entry-wage is different from ωH (pτ,α i) at date τ,i tm u s tb et h a tﬁrm i does not fully reinvest
its earnings as ﬁnancial capital at τ +1 . Because entry-wages are decreasing in ﬁnancial capital, the date τ entry-
wage must be higher than ωH (pτ,α i).S i n c eﬁrms maximize revenue subject to a ﬁnancial constraint, if a ﬁrm
does not allocate all its assets to ﬁnancial capital at some date τ, then it must be because it makes zero proﬁts
at date τ. The remaining result follows because once maximum proﬁts are zero at some date, they must be zero
forever. The intuition behind this is as follows. Since the output price is strictly above pr,t h eﬁrm makes zero
proﬁts only if young workers born at t believe it will not fully reinvest the sales revenue as ﬁnancial capital at t+1;
the latter can only happen if at the t +1entry-wage the ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts again.
Proposition 3.7 Suppose AW holds, P ∈ Σ and (γ,Ψ) is a *PBESO with vi,t (h∗)=v∗ > w2 for every t ≥ 0.





wi,t (h∗)=ωL (pt,α i) for every t ≥ τ +1such that mi,t (h∗) > 0.
3.4 Discussion of assumptions and results
Even though the possibility that a shortage in the ﬁrm’s internal labor market can be responsible for the slow
growth of an industry is realistic, it complicates the analysis enormously. Assumption AW rules that possibility
out because it implies that promotion brings about a welfare change that is so large that if workers believed the
promotion probability were λ and the wage upon promotion were c






≤ 0, which would contradict the existence of a best response for the ﬁrms.
Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 let one conclude that each *PBESO where vi,t (h∗)=v∗ describes the behavior of
ﬁrms that set up a closed internal labor market with one entry port and an up or out promotion system where skilled
workers are paid their best outside offer and no trained worker changes ﬁrms after the training process has ended.16
If c
θ > w2, the skilled worker’s wage is above what they would obtain out of the industry and so small changes in
market conditions (i.e. changes in w2) do not affect it.
Moreover, Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 (iii) imply that if AW holds, each ﬁrm maximizes next period’s sales










,a n dt h eﬁnancialcapitalrateofreturnattisR∗ (pt,w i,t (h∗),α i) ≡ pt·q(wi,t (h∗),α i).
Finally, Propositions 3.6 (iv) and 3.7 let us conclude that if AW holds, either each ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts
and fully reinvests its capital up to date T − 1 or it makes zero proﬁts and its ﬁnancial capital growth rate is
ω−1 ¡
ωL (pt,α i),α i
¢
from date 1 on, where ω−1 is the inverse of ω
16 The best outside offer depends on c and θ because of the assumption that some ﬁrms are yet to train when others have ended their
training process. This contrasts with Bernhardt and Scoones [6] where competitors incur a cost to learn the ability of outside workers but
that cost does not affect the best outside offer. This is because, in their model, ﬁrms bid for workers after that cost is sunk.
154. OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC PBE
In this section I prove that there exists a *PBESO where skilled workers are paid v∗ and ex ante identical
ﬁrms follow different growth paths that converge to a steady state where proﬁts are zero and workers receive the
same wage regardless of the ﬁrm that employs them. First, I deﬁne a family of strategies for ﬁrms and workers.
Proposition 4.1 shows that any of the sequences of entry-wages, and its associated sequences of ﬁnancial capital
growth rates, described in Proposition 3.7 can be sustained as part of the path of play of a strategy proﬁle in that
family. Proposition 4.2 shows that there exists a proﬁle of strategies in that family and a system of beliefs that
constitutes a *PBESO for a large subset of output price sequences in Σ.
Let b vo














on path h. Consider the strategy
e σ2




i if vi,t (h) ≥ b vo
i,t (h) and Oi,t (vi,t (h)) = ∅
j if b ve
j,t = b vo
i,t (h) and (j ∈ Oi,t (vi,t (h)) or b vo
i,t >v i,t (h))
o otherwise
where Oi,t (vi,t (h)) =
n
j ∈ Di : b ve
j,t (h)=vi,t (h), χj,t (h)=1
o
is the set of ﬁrms that match ﬁrm i’s offer and





.17 Old workers choose to work
where they obtain the highest wage and when indifferent between two or more wage offers they only leave the
place where they were trained if the outside offer comes from a ﬁrm which faces a binding internal labor market
constraint. Clearly, e σ2
i,t satisﬁes condition (i) in the deﬁnition of a PBE.
For each P ∈ Σ and t ≥ 0 deﬁne a family, parameterized by δ ∈ [0,1] and T ≥ Ts,o f
functions e σ1
t (T,δ|α,P ):<+ 7→ <+ and e ft (T,δ|α,P ):<3
+ 7→ <7
+ such that e ft (T,δ|α,P )=
³
e lt (α),e et (α), e wt (T,δ|α,P ),v∗,v∗, e mt (T,δ),e bt
´






A if w ≥ ωH (pt,α) and t<T− 1
A if w ≥ ωH (δ · pT−1,α) and t = T − 1







δ · a if t = T,
max{m,a} if t>T




ωH (pt,α) if t<T− 1
ωH (δ · pT−1,α) if t = T − 1,
ω(1,α) if t ≥ T
e lt (α)(l,m,a)=
α · e mt (T,δ|α,P )
e wt (T,δ|α,P )







v∗ − (1 + θ) · λl otherwise
Deﬁne strategies σH
i ∈ Wi and fH














= e ft (T,δ|αi,P)(li,t−1 (h),m i,t−1 (h),a i,t (h)) where ht
i (h)=xt
i
17 If two ﬁrms meet the criteria in the second line of the deﬁnition of the strategy, then the worker chooses the one with the lowest subindex.
This choice of a tie breaking rule is, of course, without loss of generality.
16The cut-off wage of σH
i,t is the reservation entry-wage of a worker who believes his promotion probability is that of
a ﬁrm that reinvests all its assets as ﬁnancial capital if t ≤ T −1, it reinvests a fraction δ of them if t = T and keeps
its ﬁnancial capital constant if t>T .F i r mi offers the cutoff value of σH
i,t to the young workers it contacts and
spends its ﬁnancial capital as if it were maximizing short run constrained proﬁts. For ﬁxed T ≥ Ts and δ ∈ [0,1],













describes the behavior of ﬁrm i and the workers when the latter are optimistic about
the prospects for advancement displayed by ﬁrm i.W h e n c
θ > w2, there are also strategies in which young
workers are pessimistic about the prospects for advancement displayed by ﬁrm i. For each wL
0 ∈ (w,w),w h e r e













A if w ≥ wL


































































0 if t =0
ωL (pt,α) if t ≥ 1
For ﬁxed wL
0 ∈ (w,w) deﬁne strategies σL
i ∈ Wi and fL
























(li,t−1 (h),m i,t−1 (h),a i,t (h)) where ht
i (h)=xt
i
If ﬁrm i faces workers that play strategy σL
i , it can just make zero proﬁts from date 1 on hiring workers at the
cutoff wages and, therefore, it is (weakly) optimal to reduce its ﬁnancial capital along time; strategy fL
i speciﬁes a
path of reinvestment that justiﬁes the workers’ pessimism about the prospects for advancement offered ﬁrm i.F o r
ﬁxed wL







Let b γ be the proﬁle of strategies where a fraction μH of the ﬁr m sb e l o n g st oIH and a fraction 1−μH belongs
to IL. The following proposition shows that on the path of play b h induced by b γ, no trained worker change ﬁrms
and no ﬁrm face a binding internal labor market constraint. In addition, ﬁrms in IH fully reinvest earnings while
ﬁrms in IL reduce their ﬁnancial capital during the transition towards the steady state.










for every t ≥ 0.

















for every t ≥ 0.T h es a m e
conclusion holds if c




w1 · λ and P is non-increasing.
















for every t ≥ T.
















for every t ≥ 1.





=0for every j ∈ Di; that is the role of the assumptions in Proposition 4.1 (ii). If c
θ > w2, Assumption
AW is sufﬁcient because it guarantees the promotion rate is smaller than λ.I fc





=0even for ﬁrms that fully reinvest its earnings as ﬁnancial capital at date 1;s i n c eP is a




=0for all t ≥ 1.
To deﬁne a PBE one needs to specify the beliefs of the players on information sets off the equilibrium path.






i,t (w), off the equilibrium





or b xt ∈ Ω1










is the set of paths where (a) ﬁrm i’s competitors would not face a binding internal labor market constraint even
if all its external offers were rejected, and (b) they offer v∗ to trained workers, as on b h, and (c) the supply of
externally trained workers i faces exceeds i’s demand, what is consistent with perfect competition in the output
market. Off the equilibrium path, therefore, ﬁrm i believes there are enough trained workers willing to join it and,
therefore, (6) limits only the number of internal promotions but not its production level, what allows me to break
the intertemporal problem of the ﬁrm at each information set in a sequence of one-period problems.19 For the





i,t (w) ⊂ I1





in that it opens more external vacancies, a condition that guarantees the promotion rate and,




, the young worker’s payoff
is independent of beliefs because he anticipates every other young worker rejects employment so that nobody will
be promoted at t +1 . Hence, I assume Ω1
i,t (w)=I1
i,t (w).S o ,b Ψ seems a natural choice for the players’ beliefs.
Let p∗∗ (αi)= r
q(w1,αi) be the marginal cost of a ﬁrm expected toshut down the next period, i.e. w1 = ω(0,α i).
Proposition 4.2 Suppose P ∈ Σ, δ ∈ [0,1] and pT−1 · q
¡
ωH (δ · pT−1,α i),α i
¢
>rfor every i ∈ IH.
i. If μH =1and AW holds, then
³
b γ, b Ψ
´






w1 · λ for every i ∈ I and P is non-increasing.
ii. If μH < 1, AW holds, wL
0 ∈ (w,w),a n dpt ≤ p∗∗ (αi) for every t ≥ 1 and i ∈ IL,t h e n
³
b γ, b Ψ
´
is a *PBESO.
The *PBESO in (i) describes an industry where workers are optimistic about the prospects for advancement
d i s p l a y e db ye v e r yﬁrm. In the PBE described in (ii), workers are optimistic about some ﬁrms and pessimistic
about others and this may happen even if ﬁrms are ex-ante identical, that is when αi = α for every i ∈ I. Here one
needs to impose the additional assumption that pt ≤ p∗∗ (αi) for every t ≥ 1 and i ∈ IL so that the growth rate
of ﬁrms in IL is nonnegative. The behavior of ﬁrms in IH or IL differs along the transition to the steady state.
Even though ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth paths, the worker’s entry-wage converges to the same
l e v e la td a t eT because wi,t (h)=ωL (ps,α i)=ω(1,α i) for every t ≥ T. Hence, ﬁrms playing fH
i and fL
i stop
18 Af o r m a ld e ﬁnition of these sets can be found in the appendix.
19 Recall that when
c
θ ≥ w2, it costs the same to produce one unit of task 2 employing internally promoted workers or hiring externally
trained workers.
18growing and pay the same wage from date T on. Any difference in their steady state size, therefore, originates
during the transition towards the stationary state.
For ﬁxed μH, Proposition 4.2 identiﬁes a continuum of PBE indexed by δ ∈ [0,1] and wL
0 ∈ (w,w). In section
5, I show that for each wL
0 ∈ (w,w) the value of δ is pinned down by the output market clearing condition.
4.1 Robustness
The assumption that workers live for two periods, together with the fact that the internal labor market constraint
never binds, implies ﬁrms never raid and train immediately a high ability worker who is not promoted by other
ﬁrm. This is because he is less productive than a worker promoted internally but must be paid the same wage upon
promotion. If the worker lived for three periods or more, however, he could be trained in the third period of his
life either by the ﬁrst period employer or by a ﬁrm who raid him in the second period to perform the ﬁrst task.
However, no ﬁrm would be willing to do so because it costs the same to train him than to train a worker who has
developed high ability and is two-years old but the latter can perform the second task for one period more than the
former. Consequently, a high ability worker who has not been trained by another ﬁrm can perform only task 1 and
must be paid at least w2. Since young workers are willing to perform the same task at a lower wage, therefore, no
ﬁrm would raid high ability workers even if they lived more than two periods. Likewise, an increase in the number
of periods a worker lives does not affect his wage upon promotion since this wage is determined by the trade-off
between the training cost and the speciﬁc ability faced by the competitors of his ﬁrst-period employer.
5. INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM
The concept of equilibrium used in the previous sections does not require the output market to clear at the
prices the ﬁrms take as given. This is a drawback because the evolution of output prices is related to the evolution
of ﬁrms’ assets through the market clearing condition. To capture this aspect of industry evolution, I deﬁne an
Industry Equilibrium (IE) as a collection of strategies, beliefs and output prices P such that the strategies of ﬁrms
and workers are a PBE of Γ(P) and the output market clears on the equilibrium path of Γ(P).
To simplify the exposition, I assume αi ∈ {αH,α L} for every i ∈ I. Moreover, since the family of strategies
considered in section 4 is rich enough to sustain any outcome described in Propositions 3.6 and 3.7, I restrict
the analysis to that type of strategies. I assume each ﬁrm belongs either to IL or IH with the understanding
that if ﬁrms are heterogeneous, ﬁrms with αi = αH are in IH and those with αi = αL are in IL;i fﬁrms are
homogenous, instead, I assume a fraction μH belongs to IH while the rest are in IL. This equilibrium concept
does not restrict ex-ante identical ﬁrms to play the same strategy. Heterogeneous behavior may arise either because
ﬁrms have different technologies or due to a coordination problem among the inﬁnite generations of workers.20
20 A plausible story of how ex-ante identical ﬁrms end up partitioned in these two sets is as follows. At date zero, after ﬁrms announce their







i for ﬁxed T, δ and w
L
0 and updates his common prior about the strategy of that ﬁrm. The realization of the sunspot at








∈ Wt × Wt.




such that P ∈ <∞
+ , μH ∈ [0,1] and
1. (γ,Ψ) is a *PBESO of Γ(P) in which either i ∈ IL or i ∈ IH,
2. qH




= D(pt), for every t ≥ 0,
where qL
t (h∗) and qH
t (h∗) are the aggregate output produced at date t on h∗ by ﬁrms in IL and IH, respectively.
In a steady state with zero proﬁts and ex-ante identical ﬁrms, the entry-wage is ω(1,α) and the output price
is ps (α) every period. Then, the market clears if and only if the aggregate ﬁnancial capital is
ps(α)·D(ps(α))
r .F o r
k ∈ {L,H},l e tak
t (h) and mk
t (h) be the aggregate assets and ﬁnancial capital of ﬁrms in Ik at t on h ∈ H∞.
6. INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM WITH EX ANTE IDENTICAL FIRMS
In this section, I consider an industry with ex-ante identical ﬁrms, i.e. αi = α for all i ∈ I.21 In section 6.1,
I analyze the benchmark case where ﬁrms are not ﬁnancially constrained at date zero. Section 6.2, turns to the
more interesting scenario where ﬁrms are constrained. In section 6.2.1, I state conditions under which an IE where
ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow identical growth paths exists and is unique; furthermore I show it converges to a
Walrasian-like state in ﬁnite time and I analyze its efﬁciency properties. In section 6.2.2, I show, by means of an
example, that there is also IE where ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth paths.
6.1 Unconstrained IE
I begin with the case in which a0 ≥
ps·D(ps)
r and so ﬁrms have enough assets to drive proﬁts to zero from the
start. Let Ps be the sequence with pt = ps for all t ≥ 0.C l e a r l y ,Ps ∈ Σ. In any IE associated to Ps,e v e r yﬁrm is in
IH,f o rT =0and δ =
ps·D(ps)
r·a0 , and the industry output level is D(ps). Hence, ex-ante identical ﬁrms produce the
same, ﬁrms are not ﬁnancially constrained and workers performing the same task receive the same wage regardless
of the ﬁrm that employs them. If v∗ = w2,t h e nps = p∗ and allocative efﬁciency holds. Otherwise, too little is
produced with respect to the efﬁcient allocation (i.e. ps >p ∗) but technological efﬁciency holds because each ﬁrm
pays wages ω(1) and v∗ and maximizes proﬁts.
To understand why too little is produced when v∗ > w2, notice that the marginal cost is ps = r
q(ω(1)) while the
marginal cost in the efﬁcient allocation is p∗ = r











Maxlα · s1−α s.t. w1 · l +( w2 + c) · s ≤ 1 (13)
The two marginal costs are equal if and only if v∗ = w2 and so ω(1) = w1.S oi ts u f ﬁces to argue that v∗ > w2
implies q(ω(1)) <q ∗. The answer is not obvious because as v∗ increases, the wage of young workers decreases.
However, since workers discount the future, a marginal increase in v∗ leads to a less than proportional reduction in
ω(1).S i n c eω(1) = w1 − β ·
si,t+1(h∗)
e li,t(h∗) · (v∗ − w2) and si,t (h∗)=si,t+1 (h∗),i tf o l l o w st h a t
1=ω(1) ·b li,t (h∗)+( v∗ + c) · si,t (h∗)
= w1 ·b li,t (h∗)+[ ( 1− β) · v∗ + β · w2 + c] · si,t (h∗) > w1 ·b li,t (h∗)+( w2 + c) · si,t (h∗)
21 In this section, to simplify notation, I omit the parameter α in the functions q, ω , ω
H,ω
L, ps,p r and p
∗.
20Therefore, (li,t (h∗),s i,t (h∗)) is in the feasible set of problem (13) which implies that q(ω(1)) <q ∗.
Remark 3: This argument shows that the lack of allocative efﬁciency in the steady state does not depend on the
assumption that ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained; the impossibility of enforcing a long term contract in which an
old worker is paid w2 induces the lack of allocative efﬁciency.
Remark 4: Since the industry is in steady state from the start when a0 ≥
ps·D(ps)
r , one cannot address issues such
as how the prospects for advancement displayed by the ﬁrm affects its growth path or its long run size.
6.2 Constrained IE: 0 <a 0 <
ps·D(ps)
r
This section analyzes the case in which 0 <a 0 <
ps·D(ps)
r and so the initial ﬁnancial capital falls short of
the steady state level. Proposition 6.1 in section 6.2.1 shows that there is a unique IE where every ﬁrm displays
identical prospects for advancement and output prices are in Σ. In that equilibrium, ﬁrms and workers behave
according to the optimistic strategies described in section 4. In section 6.2.2, I show by example that if AW holds,
there exists IE in which ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth paths.
6.2.1 Identical Growth Paths
Suppose there is an IE with μH =1 .F r o m d a t e T on, the output price is ps, the entry-wage is ω(1),t o t a l
supply is q[ω(1)] · mH
T (h∗)= r
ps · mH
T (h∗) and mH
T (h∗)=
ps·D(ps)
r by market clearing. The unknowns,
then, are the output prices along the transition towards the steady state, that is, the sequence {pt}
T−1
t=0 .S i n c e
qH






















T−1(h∗) and by market clearing one obtains δ =
ps·D(ps)
r·pT−1·D(pT−1).
If T =1 , then (14) completely describes the output prices along the transition to the steady state. If T>1,






t (h∗)=D(p) for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2 (15)
Lemma 6.1 Suppose AD holds. If m ≤
ps·D(ps)















and P(m) >p r if and only if m<
pr·D(pr)
r .
If T>1, Lemma 6.1 implies that p0 = P(a0). One concludes that for any T ≥ 1, the workers’ date zero entry-





if T =1and wi,0 (h∗)=ωH (P(a0)) if T>1. In addition,
conditions (14) and (15) show that prices and entry-wages depend only on the aggregate ﬁnancial capital at any
date t ≤ T − 1.S i n c e mi,t (h∗)=pt−1 · q(wi,t−1 (h∗)) · mi,t−1 (h∗) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and i ∈ I,t h e
uniqueness of p0 implies there is at most one equilibrium sequence of prices in Σ when every ﬁrm belongs to IH.
In order to prove the existence of an IE, I construct a sequence P ∈ Σ by iterating the map P until the ﬁrst date
that full reinvestment of revenues would make the aggregate ﬁnancial capital larger than
ps·D(ps)
r .T h a td a t ei st h e
21candidate for date T − 1; to complete the sequence {pt}
T−1
t=0 ,Ic h o o s epT−1 to be the solution of (14) given the
value of mH










be the initial capital such that constraint (6) binds at the
date zero output clearing price when c
θ = w2.
Proposition 6.1 Assume AD. If AW holds or c
θ = w2 and a0 ≥ a, a unique IE with P ∈ Σ and μH =1exists.
In this IE, technological efﬁciency holds since ﬁrms pay the same to workers performing identical tasks. The
credit constraint causes a failure of allocative efﬁciency in the transition to the steady state. If c
θ = w2,h o w e v e r ,t h e
efﬁcient output level is achieved in steady state because D(ps)=D(p∗).I fc
θ > w2, instead, allocative efﬁciency
fails even in the steady state because D(ps) <D(p∗). Since allocative efﬁciency would also have failed in steady
state if ﬁrms were unconstrained at date zero but would hold if c
θ ≤ w2, one concludes it is the impossibility of
enforcing a wage w2 for the skilled workers, rather than the credit constraint, what causes industry output to fall
short of the efﬁcient level in the long run.
The example in the next section, in turn, shows that a credit constraint is necessary to explain why ex-ante
identical ﬁrms might follow different growth paths and have different market shares in the long run.
6.2.2 Different Growth Paths
Now suppose μH ∈ (0,1) and AW holds. Proposition 6.2 explains how the retained earnings dynamic selects
among ﬁrms that promote workers internally since it shows that in any IE with P ∈ Σ,t h o s eﬁrms that display the
worst prospects for advancement at date zero co n t i n u et os h o wt h ew o r s tp r o s p e c t su pt od a t eT.
Proposition 6.2 Suppose μH ∈ (0,1) and AW holds. If wi,0 (h∗) ∈ (w,w) and P ∈ Σ,t h e ni ∈ IL and
wi,t (h∗) >w j,t (h∗) for every t such 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and j ∈ IH.
It follows from Proposition 6.2 that ﬁrms that display better prospects for advancement at date zero have a
higher growth rate along the transition towards the steady state and a higher steady state market share than ﬁrms
that, ceteris paribus, initially show worse prospects for advancement. One concludes that among ex-ante identical
ﬁrms, the retained earning dynamic favors those ﬁrms that display better prospects for advancement at date zero.
The rest of this section characterizes an IE in which ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth paths and












0 = D(p0) w <w L
0 ≤ w (16)
where the left hand side is the date zero short run industry supply function. For any initial level of aggregate
ﬁnancial capital, a0 = aH
0 + aL
0, the assumption that wL
0 >wimplies the industry supply shifts to the left
when compared to the case in which ﬁrms display equal prospects for advancement. Therefore, there is an
excess of demand at P(a0), the price which solves (16) when μH =1 . Likewise, there is an excess of supply





. Since the date zero supply function is strictly increasing in prices, demand is strictly

































and w <w L
0 ≤ w.
22 If pr · D(pr) ≥ ps · D(ps), it can be shown that the equilibrium I ﬁnd is the unique IE with P ∈ Σ.
22Since ﬁrm i ∈ IL makes zero proﬁts at any 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 but wages are bounded above by w1, then output
prices are bounded above by p∗∗ = r











t (h∗)=D(pt) if 1 ≤ t<T− 1








, there is an excess






















that clears the market.










































Example 1: Demand is D(p)=1
p, AD holds and expenditure is always equal to 1.23 Suppose
α =0 .5 λ ≥ 0.2 c =1 w1 =0 .2 aH
0 =0 .14
β =9 /10 1
r =0 .9 θ =0 .5 w2 =8 /9 aL
0 =0 .06
I choose parameters so that AW holds. In the steady state, aggregate ﬁnancial capital is 1
r =0 .9, wages are







5 = p∗. In the unique equilibrium in






and T = Ts =1 . The entry-wage
is 0.08 at date zero and 0.15 thereafter, while the probability of promotion for a young worker is 0.12 at date zero
and 0.05 afterwards. Financial capital at date zero is mH
0 (h∗)=0 .2 and mH
t (h∗)=0 .9 for all t ≥ 1.
However, there are other equilibria in which, for example, only 2/3 of the ﬁrms are in IH. I have chosen
the parameters values so that in any IE either T =1or T =2 . This example is robust to values of μH around
2
3. Firms in IL display worst prospects for advancement than those in IH iff wL
0 > 0.08. Hence, the date zero
price must exceed 2
√
6, the market clearing price when all ﬁrms display equal prospects for advancement. Then,










b γ, b Ψ
´o
is an IE with























1 (h∗)) ∈ [0,1] and (iv) p1 · q
£
ωH (δ · p1)
¤
>r .
















to (17), for each wL










.C l e a r l y ,P = {p0,p 1,p s,p s,...} satisﬁes
pt ∈ [ps,p ∗∗) for all t ≥ 1 and then (i) and (ii) hold. The choice of u ensures 0 <m H
1 (h∗)+mL
1 (h∗) < 1
r and






1 (h∗) ≥ 1




1 (h∗)) ≤ 1.S i n c e p1 ≥ ps and
mL











1 (h∗) <m L
1 (h∗),
23 This functional form simpliﬁes the analysis because the industry revenue at date 1 exceeds the steady state ﬁnancial capital. However, if
ﬁrms follow different strategies it may take more than one period for the industry to converge to the steady state. This is because the assets
of those ﬁrms that display good growth prospects may fall short of the steady state level at date 1.
23Figure 2. Equilibrium Prices and Steady State Market Shares
then mH
2 (h∗)=δ · p1 · q
£
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1 (h∗) > 1,
p1 · q
£
ωH (δ · p1)
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b γ, b Ψ
´o
is an IE for any wL
0 ∈ (u,0.2].24
For each wL
0 ∈ (u,0.2], ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow different growth paths. On the right hand side of Figure
2, I plot the steady state market share of ﬁrms in IL and IH for each wL
0 . For large values of wL
0 , ﬁrms in IL
display very poor prospects for advancement at date zero and they are almost driven out at date 2. For example, if
the date zero entry-wage is larger than 0.18, the steady state market share of ﬁrms in IL is smaller than 1%. ¤
This example shows that ex-ante identical ﬁrms can follow different growth paths and have different sizes in the
steady state. Since ﬁrms pay different wages to their young workers along the transition, technological efﬁciency
holds only in the steady state. My analysis of the cases where ﬁrms are unconstrained or v∗ = w2 implies these
results depend both on ﬁnancial constraints and the impossibility of enforcing a wage w2 for skilled workers.
7. INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
In this section, I provide the example in which ﬁrms have different technologies, one ﬁrm produces inefﬁciently
every period but it dominates the market, in terms of market share, in the long run.
Withsomeabuseofnotation,letq(l,s;αi)denoteq(l,s,0;αi). InFigure3, Iillustratetherelationshipbetween
the two production functions plotting the isoquant associated with output level q for each technology.
Recall that ﬁrm i ∈ IH if αi = αH and i ∈ IL if αi = αL. If both ﬁrms choose an input bundle that lies below
the diagonal, ﬁrms in IH produce inefﬁciently. Indeed, since q(l,s;αi)=l ·
¡s
l
¢1−αi,f o ra n y(l,s) ∈ <2
++ such
that s






for all t ≥ 0 and αH <α L, ﬁrms in IH produce inefﬁciently and ﬁrms in IL produce efﬁciently every period.
24 I tc a na l s ob es h o w nt h a tf o ra n yw
L





q(L ,S ;α) =   Η q
q(L ,S ;α) =  L q
Figure 3. Isoquants of ﬁrms H and L.
In example 2, I show that if young workers are pessimistic enough about the prospects displayed by ﬁrms in
IL, ﬁrms in IH end up dominating the market. Let wi
s = ω(1,α i) be ﬁrm i’s steady state entry-wage. Since both


































Example 2: The demand function is D(p)=1
p, as in example 1. Suppose λ =0 .95, β = 1
r =0 .9 and





4 ' 0.587 c =0 .04
αL =0 .5 μH =0 .7 w2 =0 .63 c
θ =1 .33
I choose the parameters so that assumption AW and condition (18) holds. In this example, 7/10 of the ﬁrms are
in IH and 3/10 of the ﬁrms are in IL. The initial aggregate ﬁnancial capital is 0.3 and the steady state aggregate
ﬁnancial capital is 1
r =0 .9.S i n c e wL
s ' 0.398 and wH
s ' 0.113, ﬁrms in IH display better prospects for
advancement than ﬁrms in IL do in steady state. For any wL
0 ∈ [0.276,w1], there exists an IE in which Ts =2
and young workers born at date zero believe ﬁrms in IH display better prospects for advancement than ﬁrms in











































1 (h∗)=p0 · q
¡
ωH (p0,α H),α H
¢
· aH




1 (h∗) < 1
r. In the left panel of Figure 4, the dashed line corresponds to p0, the solution to the
ﬁrst equation, while the full line corresponds to p1, the solution to the second equation.
For each wL







0 ∈ (w,w). In addition, 1 − r · mL
1 (h∗)+G
¡
wL (p1,α L),α L
¢
· mL
1 (h∗) ≥ 1





1 (h∗)) ≤ 1.S i n c e p1 ≥ ps (αL), then G
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≤ 1.S i n c e
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>r . By proposition 4.2, an IE exists.


















Figure 4. Equilibrium Prices and Steady State Market Shares
sufﬁciently bad prospects, those ﬁrms are almost driven out, in terms of market share, in the steady state. For
example, if wL
0 ≥ 0.5 then the steady state market share of ﬁrms in IL is below 0.01 (see the right panel of Figure
4) which means that almost all the production is carried out by workers of ﬁrms in IH. In those steady states
not only every ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts, is not ﬁnancially constrained and maximizes proﬁts, but also almost all
workers who perform the same job receive the same wage, regardless of the ﬁrm that hires them, as in a Walrasian











v∗+c ≤ 9 ·
wH
s
v∗+c < 1 ∀i ∈ IH
If all labor were allocated to ﬁrm L, more output could be produced without altering workers’ welfare. ¤
8. CONCLUSION
In competitive output markets, the retained earnings dynamic gives an evolutionary advantage to ﬁrms with
lower unit costs. However, unit costs are determined not only by technological efﬁciency but also by wages.
Unlike in Walrasian markets, worker’s expectations about the opportunities for advancement within the ﬁrm are
key to determine wages in internal labor markets. As a consequence, the ﬁtness of a ﬁrm depends not only on
its technological efﬁciency but also on workers’ beliefs. This paper suggests that, at least in the long run, the
retained earnings dynamic justiﬁes the use of the standard static analysis of competitive markets to make positive
predictions but does not justify its efﬁciency properties. Unlike in Blume and Easley’s model [7], even the steady
state of the retained earnings dynamic may fail to be efﬁcient. In contrast with Beker [4], I do not need to assume
a stochastic technology to show that inefﬁcient ﬁrms can dominate a competitive output market. As in Arthur
[2], what happens at the origin of the industry has a decisive role on the technology that dominates the market.
However, it is not a network externality or the presence of increasing returns what drives the result but the young
workers’ beliefs about the prospects for advancement offered by the ﬁrms.
26APPENDIX
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where e fi,t : Ht
i 7→ <7
+ is deﬁned as follows:
a) If xτ
i = hτ
i (h∗), e fi,τ (xτ
i )=di,τ (h).
b) If t ≥ τ +1and xt
i is the partial history of ﬁrm i consisting in hτ
i (h∗) followed by the actions of the





, consider any h0 ∈ H∞ such that ht
i (h0)=xt







li,t (h∗),e i,t (h∗),w i,t (h∗),v i,t (h∗),ve
i,t (h∗),m i,t (h∗),a i,t (h0) − mi,t (h∗)
´
.S i n c ee fi,τ (xτ
i ) ∈ Ai,τ (xτ
i ),i t










for everyτ+1 ≤ k ≤ t.S i n c ewi,k (h∗)·li,k (h∗)+ve
i,k (h∗)·ei,k (h∗)=




− mi,k (h∗) > 0 (19)
for all k such that τ +1≤ k ≤ t.S i n c eai,τ+1 (h0) − ai,τ+1 (h∗)=[ Ri,τ (h) − Ri,τ (h∗)] · ai,τ (h∗) > 0,( 1 9 )












for all k such that τ+1 ≤ k ≤ t, then (19) holds for all k such that τ+1 ≤ k ≤ t. Clearly, (20) holds at k = τ+1.
We prove by induction that it holds for all τ +1≤ k ≤ t. Suppose it holds up to k ≥ τ +1for some k<t .S i n c e
si,τ+1 (h0)=si,τ+1 (h∗) ≤ λ ·b li,τ (h)=λ ·b li,τ (h0) and si,k (h0)=si,k (h∗) ≤ λ ·b li,k−1 (h∗)=λ ·b li,k−1 (h0) for
any k>τ+1, then ai,k (h0)−ai,k (h∗)=r·[ai,k−1 (h0) − ai,k−1 (h∗)] and iterating backwards one obtains (20).
















The argument in (a) - (c) implies that e fi ∈ Fi.L e te h = h∗
³
hτ
i (h∗), e fi,γ
´




>a i,t (h∗) for


















βk+1−τ · ai,k+1 (h∗)=EΨIi,τ(hτ
i (h∗)) (πi,τ (fi,γ|αi,P)) ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.2: (i) Since vi,t (h∗) < w2 implies b si,t (h∗)=0 ,t h e nvi,t (h∗) ≥ w2.
(ii) Suppose vi,t (h∗) 6= ve
j,t (h∗) ∀j ∈ Di.I fve
j,t (h∗) >v i,t (h∗) or ve
j,t (h∗) ≤ w2 ∀j ∈ Di, choose v such




j,t (h∗) <v i,t (h∗) & j ∈ Di
o
<v<
vi,t (h∗). Since old workers trained by ﬁrm i w h os t a yi nﬁrm i at wage vi,t (h∗) still accept when offered v,t h e n
ﬁrm i has a proﬁtable deviation. Indeed, let d =
³
li,t (h∗),e i,t (h∗),w i,t (h∗),v,ve
i,t (h∗),m i,t (h∗),b i,t (h∗)
´
.
Clearly, d ∈ Ai,t (h∗). Consider h such that




Sincewi,t (h)=wi,t (h∗),t h e nb li,t (h)=b li,t (h∗)andλ·b li,t (h) ≥ si,t+1 (h∗). ByProposition3.1, Ri,t (h) ≤ Ri,t (h∗).
Sincevj,t (h)=vj,t (h∗)foreveryj ∈ Si,th enei,t (h)=ei,t (h∗). Observethatvi,t (h)=
h
v,ve
i,t (h∗),χ i,t (h∗)
i
and (1) in the deﬁnition of PBE implies b ei,t (h)=b ei,t (h∗) and si,t (h) ≥ si,t (h∗).S i n c evj,t (h)=vj,t (h∗) for
27every j ∈ Di, b si,t (h) ≥ b si,t (h∗) because those accepting a promotion at vi,t (h∗) continue to accept at v.T h u s ,
qi,t (h) ≥ qi,t (h∗). By (9) and the assumption that si,t (h∗)=b si,t (h∗),
[Ri,t (h) − Ri,t (h∗)]·ai,t (h∗)=pt·[qi,t (h) − qi,t (h∗)]+c·[b si,t (h∗) − si,t (h)]+vi,t (h∗)·b si,t (h∗)−v·b si,t (h).
Suppose si,t (h)=b si,t (h)=b si,t (h∗).T h e n [Ri,t (h) − Ri,t (h∗)] · ai,t (h∗)=[ vi,t (h∗) − v] · b si,t (h) > 0,a
contradiction. Then, either si,t (h) > b si,t (h) or b si,t (h) > b si,t (h∗). Hence, qi,t (h) >q i,t (h∗).S i n c e
c · [b si,t (h∗) − si,t (h)] ≥ v · si,t (h) − vi,t (h∗) · b si,t (h∗) ≥ v · b si,t (h) − vi,t (h∗) · b si,t (h∗),
a contradiction is reached because [Ri,t (h) − Ri,t (h∗)] · ai,t (h∗) ≥ pt · [qi,t (h) − qi,t (h∗)] > 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Suppose w2 <v i,t (h∗) < c
θ.L e t vinf ≡ inf
j∈{h j∈I, e sh j,t(h∗)=sh j,t(h∗)}
vj,t (h∗).S i n c e
vinf < c




·(1 + θ) <v inf +c. Without loss in generality, suppose vi,t ≤ vinf +ε
and vi,t ≤ vh i,t for every ﬁrm e i that trains simultaneously with ﬁrm i,i . e . a n ye i ∈ I such that Dh i = Di.B y
Proposition 3.2, ve
j,t (h∗)=vi,t (h∗) for some j ∈ Di.
Suppose workers trained by ﬁrm i do not receive any outside offer matching ﬁrm i’s offer, that is, b ve
j,t (h∗)=0
for all j ∈ Di such that ve
j,t (h∗)=vi,t (h∗).F i r mi could proﬁtable deviate by offering v slightly below vi,t (h∗)
as in the proof of Proposition 3.2 (ii).
Suppose, instead, some workers trained by ﬁrm i reject the offer of some ﬁrm j that matches ﬁrm i’s offer.
Then, b ej,t (h∗) <e j,t (h∗).L e tε0 > 0 be the number of ﬁrm i’s workers who reject an ﬁrm j’s offer on h∗.S i n c e
hiring workers trained by another ﬁrm for less than c
θ is more proﬁtable than promoting internally, ﬁrm j could











v · ej,t (h∗) >





v · ej,t (h∗)
i
> 0. Clearly d ∈ Aj,t (h∗). Consider h such that




Since wj,t (h)=wj,t (h∗) and lj,t (h)=lj,t (h∗), then b lj,t (h)=b lj,t (h∗) and λ · b lj,t (h) ≥ sj,t+1 (h∗).B y
Proposition 3.1, Rj,t (h) ≤ Rj,t (h∗).
Since vh i,t (h)=vh i,t (h∗) for everye i ∈ Sj, b si,t (h∗) > 0 and vj,t (h)=
£
vj,t (h∗),v,χ j,t (h∗)
¤
, then b ej,t (h) >
b ej,t (h∗) because b ej,t (h) ≥ b ej,t (h∗)+ε0 − [ej,t (h∗) − ej,t (h)].S i n c e









then [Rj,t (h) − Rj,t (h∗)] · aj,t (h∗) ≥ pt · [qj,t (h) − qj,t (h∗)].L e t ∆ = v
ve
j,t(h∗) · b ej,t (h) − b ej,t (h∗).S i n c e
qj,t (h)=q
³
b lj,t (h∗),b sj,t (h∗) −
ve
j,t(h∗)·∆









































where I use the fact that ve
j,t (h∗)=vi,t (h∗) and 1
1+θ >
vi,t(h∗)
vj,t(h∗)+c. Hence Rj,t (h) >R j,t (h∗), a contradiction. ¥
28ProofofProposition3.4: Sinceb li,t (h∗) > 0andby(ii)inthedeﬁnition ofPBE, EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] ≥
w1 + β · w2. Suppose EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] > w1 + β · w2. By hypothesis, there is w<w i,t (h∗) such that
EΨI1
i,t(w) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] > w1 + β · w2.I fχi,t (h∗)=0 , choose w so close to wi,t (h∗) that
mi,t(h∗)−w·li,t(h∗)
vi,t(h∗)+c <
λ·li,t−1 (h∗). Condition(3) inthe deﬁnitionof PBE impliesthatyoungworkers accept employment onI1
i,t (w).L e t
e m = mi,t (h∗)−[wi,t (h∗) − w]·li,t (h∗),e b = ai,t (h∗)−e mandd =
³
li,t (h∗),e i,t (h∗),w,v i,t (h∗),ve
i,t (h∗), e m,e b
´
.
Clearly d ∈ Ai,t (h∗). Consider h such that
hτ (h)=hτ (h∗), di,t (h)=d and h = h∗ ¡
hτ (h),γ
¢
and dj,τ (h)=dj,τ (h∗) for every j 6= i.
It is easy to see that λ·b li,t (h)=λ·b li,t (h∗) ≥ si,t+1 (h∗) but [Ri,t (h) − Ri,t (h∗)]·ai,t (h∗)=r·[wi,t (h∗) − w]·
li,t (h∗) > 0 which contradicts Proposition 3.1.¥
Proof of Lemma 3.1: By deﬁnition, ﬁrm i displays better prospects than ﬁrm j if w
³
si,t+1(h∗)






e lj,t(h∗) ,v j,t+1 (h∗)
´




e lj,t(h∗) . ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.5: Suppose
si,t+1(h∗)
e li,t(h∗) = λ.S i n c ewi,t (h∗) ≥ 0, vi,t+1 (h∗) ≥ v∗ > w2 and AW holds,
EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] ≥ β · (λ · [v∗ − w2]+w2) > w1 + β · w2, a contradiction. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.6: (i) Since EΨI1
i,t(wi,t(h∗)) [Ui,t (σi,t,γ)] = wi,t (h∗)+β ·
si,t+1(h∗)







(ii) Suppose not. Then, si,t (h∗) > b si,t (h∗) for some i.L e te0 ≡ b si,t (h∗) · (1 + θ)+b ei,t (h∗) be the number
of external trained workers ﬁrm i would need to produce qi,t (h∗) if it hired b li,t (h∗) young worker and it did not









be the internal promotions ﬁrm i
w o u l dn e e dt op r o d u c eqi,t (h∗) if it hired b li,t (h∗) but faced a supply of
P
j∈Si
sj,t (h∗) externally trained workers.
Let e m ≡ v · e0 + wi,t (h∗) · li,t (h∗) ande b ≡ ai,t (h∗) − e m. Using the assumption that v∗ = c
θ, after some algebra,
one obtains that e m = mi,t (h∗) − [(v∗ − v) · e0 +( v∗ + c) · (si,t (h∗) − b si,t (h∗))].S i n c esi,t (h∗) > b si,t (h∗), one
can choose v>v ∗ such that 0 < (v∗ − v) · e0 + c · [si,t (h∗) − b si,t (h∗)] <m i,t (h∗) and so 0 < e m<m i,t (h∗).
Let d ≡
h
li,t (h∗),e 0,w i,t (h∗),v,v,e m,e b
i
. That d ∈ Ai,t (h∗) follows by deﬁnition of e m and e b and because
e m<m i,t (h∗). Then, there is h such that





Sincewi,t (h)=wi,t (h∗),t h e nb li,t (h)=b li,t (h∗)andλ·b li,t (h) ≥ si,t+1 (h∗). ByProposition3.1, Ri,t (h) ≤ Ri,t (h∗).
Since ve







.S i n c e vi,t (h) >v e
j,t (h) for all
j ∈ Di, si,t (h)=b si,t (h). Moreover, since s0 ≤ b si,t (h∗) <λ·b li,t−1 (h∗), it follows that si,t (h)=b si,t (h)=s0.
Then, b si,t (h)+
e ei,t(h)
1+θ = e0
1+θ = b si,t (h∗)+
e ei,t(h∗)




i,t (h∗) · b ei,t (h∗)+c · si,t (h∗)+vi,t (h∗) · b si,t (h∗)
¤




i,t (h) · b ei,t (h)+c · si,t (h)+vi,t (h) · b si,t (h)
¤
=0 (22)
29Finally, (21), (22) and qi,t (h)=qi,t (h∗) implies that
[Ri,t (h) − Ri,t (h∗)] · ai,t (h∗)=r · [bi,t (h) − bi,t (h∗)] − v∗ · [si,t (h∗) − b si,t (h∗)]
=[ r · (v∗ + c) − v∗] · [si,t (h∗) − b si,t (h∗)] + r · (v∗ − v) · e0




where the ﬁrst inequality follows because r>1. But this contradicts Ri,t (h) ≤ Ri,t (h∗).
(iii)If
h




lε,e ε,w i,t (h∗),v i,t (h∗),ve
i,t (h∗),m i,t (h∗),b i,t (h∗)
´
where (lε,e ε)=( 1− ε) ·
¡
li,t (h∗), v∗+c









and ε ∈ (0,1).C l e a r l y ,
dε ∈ Ai,t (h∗). By the hypothesis and the deﬁnition of eh ε,t h e r ei se ε ∈ (0,1) such that v∗
v∗+c · eh ε <λ· b li,t−1 (h∗)
and si,t+1 (h∗) <λ·
h




. Consider h such that





Since wi,t (h)=wi,t (h∗),t h e nb li,t (h)=li,t (h)=lh ε and λ ·b li,t (h) >s i,t+1 (h∗). By Proposition 3.1, Ri,t (h) ≤
Ri,t (h∗).S i n c eb ei,t (h∗)=0 ,t h e n
mi,t(h∗)−wi,t(h∗)·li,t(h∗)




v∗+c · eh ε <λ · b li,t−1 (h∗).S o χi,t (h)=χi,t (h∗)=0 .S i n c e vj,t (h)=vj,t (h∗) for every j ∈ I,t h e n
b ej,t (h)=b ej,t (h∗)=0for everyj ∈ I and b si,t (h)=si,t (h)= v∗









It follows that [Ri,t (h) − Ri,t (h∗)] = e ε · [R∗ (pt,w i,t (h∗),α i) − Ri,t (h∗)] > 0, a contradiction.
(iv) It follows trivially from (i) and (ii). ¥
Proof of Lemma 3.3 If c
θ = w2, ωH (·,α)=w1. Suppose c
θ > w2.L e tp ≥ 0, α ∈ (0,1) and B (w,p) ≡
w1 − β · 1−α
α · w
v∗+c · p · qi (w,α) · (v∗ − w2) − w. A solution to (12) exists iff there is w such that B (w,p)=0 .
Notice that B (w1,p) ≤ 0 and Lim
w→0
B (w,p)=w1 > 0.S i n c eB is continuous and strictly decreasing in w,t h e r e













then wH (p2,α) <w H (p1,α). Hence, wH is strictly decreasing in p. ¥
Lemma A.1 Suppose AW holds, P ∈ Σ and (γ,Ψ) is a *PBESO. If mi,t (h∗) <p t−1 · q(wi,t−1 (h∗),α i) ·
mi,t−1 (h∗) then pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) ≤ r.
Proof of Lemma A.1: Suppose pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) >r .D e ﬁne mε = ε · ai,t (h∗)+( 1− ε) · mi,t (h∗),
bε = ai,t (h∗)−mε, lε = 1−αi
wi,t(h∗) ·mε, eε = 1−αi
v∗ ·mε and dε =( lε,e ε,w i,t (h∗),v∗,v∗,m ε,b ε). By Propositions
3.5 and 3.6 (ii), there is e ε such that λ · lh ε >s i,t+1 (h∗) and λ · li,t−1 (h∗) > 1−αi
v∗+c · mε.C l e a r l y ,dh ε ∈ Ai,t (h∗).




Since wi,t (h)=wi,t (h∗),t h e nb li,t (h)=lh ε and λ ·b li,t (h) >s i,t+1 (h∗). By Proposition 3.1, Ri,t (h) ≤ Ri,t (h∗).
A reasoning analogous to the one used in Proposition 3.6 (ii) shows that b ei,t (h)=0and b si,t (h)=b si,t (h∗).T h e n ,
[Ri,t (h) − Ri,t (h∗)] · ai,t (h∗)=[ pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) − r] ·e ε · [ai,t (h∗) − mi,t (h∗)] > 0, a contradiction. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.7: First I show that pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) ≤ r ⇒ pt+1 · q(wi,t+1 (h∗),α i) ≤ r.S i n c e





by Proposition 3.6, then
mi,t+1(h∗)
mi,t(h∗) <p t · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) ≤ r. By Lemma A.1, pt+1 · q(wi,t+1 (h∗),α i) ≤ r.
30From this, it follows trivially that pτ · q(wi,τ (h∗),α i)=r ⇒ pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) ≤ r for every t ≥ τ +1 .
Let τ be the ﬁrst t such that wi,t (h∗) 6= ωH (pt,α i).S i n c e pt >p r and wi,t (h∗)=ωH (pt,α i) for all
t<τ , then pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) >rfor all t<τ . By Lemma A.1, mi,t (h∗)=ai,t (h∗) for all t<τ .S i n c e
mi,τ (h∗)=G(wi,τ−1 (h∗),α i) · ai,τ−1 (h∗), then mi,τ (h∗)=ai,τ (h∗).S i n c e mi,τ+1 (h∗) ≤ ai,τ+1 (h∗)=
pτ · q(wi,τ (h∗),α i) · ai,τ (h∗) and wi,τ (h∗) 6= ωH (pτ,α i),t h e n
mi,τ+1(h∗)





. By Lemma A.1, mi,τ+1 (h∗) <p τ · q(wi,τ (h∗),α i) · mi,τ (h∗) implies that
pτ+1 · q(wi,τ+1 (h∗),α i) ≤ r. By the argument above, pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) ≤ r for all t ≥ τ +1 . Suppose there
is t ≥ τ +1such that pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i) <rand mi,t (h∗) > 0. Clearly, Ri,t (h∗) <rand Ri,k (h∗) ≤ r for





where e fi,k : Hk
i 7→ Ai,k is deﬁned as follows. If k<τor τ ≤ k and
hτ
i (h) 6= hτ










.I fk ≥ τ and hτ
i (h)=hτ





















1−β·r · ai,t (h∗)
>
h





· ai,t (h∗) ≥ EΨIi,τ(ht
i(h∗)) [πi,t (fi,γ|αi,P)]
a contradiction. One concludes that pt · q(wi,t (h∗),α i)=r for every t ≥ τ +1such that mi,t (h∗) > 0. ¥
B. PROOFS OF SECTION 4
I begin this section with a lemma that puts a bound on the growth rate of ﬁnancial capital.
Lemma A.2 Suppose AW holds and h0 = h∗ ¡
xt,b γ
¢
for some xt ∈ Ht.T h e n ,
mi,t(h0)
mi,t−1(h0) ≤ G(wi,t−1 (h0),α i).





·mi,t−1 (h0)=G(wi,t−1 (h0),α i)·
mi,t−1 (h0).I ft ≥ 2, mi,t (h0) ≤ G
¡
ωL (pt,α i),α i
¢
· mi,t−1 (h0)=G(wi,t−1 (h0),α i) · mi,t−1 (h0).














































If t ≥ T,t h e nmi,t+1 (h0) ≤ mi,t (h0)=G[ω(1,α i),α i] · mi,t (h0)=G(wi,t (h0),α i) · mi,t (h0). It follows
that mi,t+1 (h0) ≤ G(wi,t (h0),α i) · mi,t (h0) for every t ≥ 0 and i ∈ I. ¥





































and so (i) holds at every date t ≥ 0 and i ∈ I.
Considerdate0.S i n c e
ai,0(e h)−wi,0(e h)·li,0(e h)
v∗+c = 1−αi
v∗+c·a0 and 1−αi





















































i ∈ IL. Thus, (iii) holds at 0.




































mi,t−1(e h) <λ . If AW holds,
then using Lemma A.2 and that 1−αi
αi · w















mi,t−1(e h) ≤ 1−αi
αi ·
wi,t−1(e h)




v∗+c · p0 · r
p∗(αi) <λ . Therefore, for every j ∈ Si workers trained by ﬁrm j prefer to stay in j rather

















so that (ii) holds at date t.








= v∗ ≥ w2, workers trained by























ai,t−1(e h) + r ·
bi,t−1(e h)















































































.S i n c e pt >p r and ωL (pt−1,α i) ≥
ωH (pt−1,α i), then G
£



























and then (iii) holds at t for every i ∈ IL. ¥
Lemma A.3Letxt
i ∈ Ht




.I fχj,t (h0)=0forallj ∈ I, thenRi,t (h0)=R∗ [pt,w i,t (h0),α i].
Proof of Lemma A.3: Since vj,t (h0)=v∗ for every j ∈ Si, ve
i,t (h0)=v∗ and χi,t (h0)=0 , then workers
trained by ﬁrm j ∈ Si do not move to ﬁrm i. Thus, b ei,t (h0)=0 .S i n c e vi,t (h0)=v∗, ve
j,t (h0)=v∗ and
χj,t (h0)=0for every j ∈ Di, workers trained by ﬁrm i do not move either after the training process has
ended. Thus, b si,t (h0)=1−αi
v∗+c · mi,t (h0).T h e n , Ri,t (h0)=R∗ (pt,w i,t (h0),α i) ·
mi,t(h0)
ai,t(h0) + r ·
bi,t(h0)
ai,t(h0).S i n c e
wi,0 (h0) ∈ [w,w),t h e nR∗ (pt,w i,t (h0),α i) ≥ r if t ≤ T − 1 and R∗ (pt,w i,t (h0),α i)=r if t ≥ T. Suppose
i ∈ IH.S i n c emi,t (h0)=ai,t (h0) if t ≤ T − 1,t h e nRi,t (h0)=R∗ [pt,w i,t (h0),α i]. Suppose i ∈ IL.S i n c e










































































































































































where h0 = h∗ ¡
b xt,b γ
¢
. The second step shows no other strategy can yield a larger payoff to ﬁrm i. The third step
argues that no young worker has a proﬁtable deviation either at date t.
























































First, I show that χj,k (h0)=0for all k ≥ t +1and j ∈ I. That (24) holds for any k ≥ t +1then follows by
Lemma A.3. Since wj,k (h0) is the cutoff value of the young workers’ strategy at date k ≥ t for every j ∈ I,t h e n
b lj,k (h0)=e lk (αj)[lj,k−1 (h0),m j,k−1 (h0),a j,k (h0)] =
αj
wj,k(e h) · mj,k (h0) for every k ≥ t and j ∈ I. Therefore,






mj,k−1(h0) ≤ λ. If AW holds the latter always
holds by Lemmas A.2 and 3.2. If μH =1 , c



















v∗+c · p0 · r
p∗(αj) <λ .
Finally, I show (24) holds at date t. Suppose xt






Lemma A.3, once again, implies that Ri,t (h0)=R∗ [pt,w i,t (h0),α i]. Now, suppose xt
i is such that χi,t (h0) 6=0 .
Consider ﬁrst a ﬁrm j ∈ Si.S i n c eve







i,t (h0)=v∗,t h e nsj,t (h0)=
(1−αj)·h mt(T,δ)(xt
j)
v∗+c and workers trained by ﬁrm j who receive an











, then b ei,t (h0)=ei,t (h0)=1−αi
v∗ ·mi,t (h0)−(1 + θ)·λ·li,t−1 (h0).C o n s i d e rn o wj ∈ Di.S i n c eχj,t (h0)=
0 and ve





,t h e nb si,t (h0)=si,t (h0)=λ · li,t−1 (h0). Therefore, b si,t (h0)+
e ei,t(h0)
1+θ = 1−αi












ai,t(e h) = R∗ (pt,w i,t (h0),α i)
by an argument analogous to the one used in Lemma A.3.












. Then there exists a strategy





































whereh00 = h∗ ¡
b xt,f,b γ−i
¢
,t h e r ei sk ≥ tsuchthatRi,k (h00) >R ∗ (pk,w i,k (h0),α i).S i n c eR∗ (pk,w i,k (h0),α i) ≥
r, it follows that Ri,k (h00) >rand mi,k (h00) > 0. This implies thatb li,k (h00) > 0 and b si,k (h00)+
e ei,k(h00)
1+θ > 0.T h e n
wi,k (h00) ≥ wi,k (h0), b si,k (h00) · (vi,k (h00) − v∗) ≥ 0, b ei,k (h00) ·
³
ve
i,k (h00) − v∗
´
≥ 0 and wi,k (h00) · b li,k (h00)+
(vi,k (h00)+c) · b si,k (h00)+ve














wi,k (h0) · l +( v∗ + c) · s + v∗ · e =1
s · (vi,k (h00) − v∗) ≥ 0 and e ·
³
ve
i,k (h00) − v∗
´
≥ 0
But this implies that Ri,k (h00) ≤ R∗ (pk,w i,k (h0),α i), a contradiction.
Third step: Suppose a young worker has a proﬁtable deviation at information set I1












e li,t(e h) · [v∗ − w2]+w2
¶
= w1 +β · w2,




.L e t hw = h∗
³b xt,b γ
´





obtains w + β ·
³
si,t+1(hw)
e li,t(hw) · [v∗ − w2]+w2
´




e li,t(e h) ,n op r o ﬁtable deviation can exist because w+β·
³
si,t+1(hw)










e li,t(e h) · [v∗ − w2]+w2
¶
.S i n c e si,t+1 (hw)=1−αi
v∗+c ·
mi,t+1(hw)







e li,t(e h) ,i t












= v∗ and χj,t
³b xt
´
=0for every j ∈ I,t h e nb ej,t (hw)=0for every j ∈
















.I f mi,t+1 (hw)=δt+1 · ai,t+1 (hw),w h e r eδt+1 =1if t 6= T − 1 and δT = δ,
mi,t+1(hw)
























e li,t(e h) ≥
mi,t+1(e h)





















, every other young worker rejects and so b li,t (hw)=0and si,t+1 (hw)=0because qi,t (hw)=0 .I f





C. PROOFS OF SECTION 6
Proof of Lemma 6.1: Suppose AD holds and m ≤
ps·D(ps)











·m−D(p). By Lemma 3.3 and assumption AD it follows that H is continuous
and strictly increasing in both m and p. By AD, limp→∞ H (p,m) > 0.S i n c e H is continuous, to show that








r ·q(w)·(v∗ − w2).S i n c eω(1) is also a solution to that equation,
it follows that ωH ¡ps
r
¢



















ps ·m−D(ps) ≤ 0 where the last inequality follows from the assumption that m ≤
ps·D(ps)
r . By the intermediate
value theorem there exists p>
ps
r such that H (p,m)=0 .S i n c e H is strictly increasing in its ﬁrst argument,










such that H [P(m),m]=0 .






=0=H [P(m),m] if and only if m<
pr·D(pr)
r . Hence P(m) >p r if
and only if m<
pr·D(pr)
r , as desired. ¥
Lemma A.4 Let c
θ ≥ w1. Suppose 0 <m<
ps·D(ps)
r and P (m) · D(P(m)) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r . Equation (14)h a sa











≥ Max{ps,P(m)} and pT−1 · D(pT−1) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r .
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θ > w1. Suppose 0 <m<
ps·D(ps)
r and P(m) · D(P(m)) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r .S i n c e
0 <
ps·D(ps)










= ωH (P(m)).H e n c e ,















. Clearly, pT−1 solves (14) and pT−1 ≥




















r . Therefore, pT−1 >p s and pT−1 ≥ max{ps,P(m)}.
Is h o wpT−1 · D(pT−1) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r by reduction to the absurd. Suppose pT−1 · D(pT−1) <
ps·D(ps)





















· pT−1 · q(wT−1) · β · (v∗ − w2) − ωT−1 = B (wT−1,p T−1)
and since B (·,p T−1) is decreasing in its ﬁrst argument, it follows that wT−1 <ω H (pT−1). Hence, ωH (P(m)) <
ωH (pT−1) which implies that P(m) >p T−1, a contradiction since D(pT−1)=q(wT−1) · m ≤ D(P(m)) and
D is decreasing in p. It follows that pT−1 · D(pT−1) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r ,a sd e s i r e d .¥
Proof of Proposition 6.1: First I consider the existence of an IE and then I turn to its uniqueness.
EXISTENCE: There are two cases to consider depending on the value of P(a0) · D(P(a0)).
Case (i): P(a0) · D(P(a0)) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r







·a0 = D(p) has a unique solution p0 and
ps·D(ps)
r ≤ p0·D(p0).
Let b δ =
ps·D(ps)
r·p0·D(p0).C l e a r l y , b δ ∈ [0,1].L e t Ts =1and deﬁne P = {p0,p s,p s,...}. Clearly, P ∈ Σ and is




b δ · p0
´i
>p s · q(ω(1)) = r. By Proposition
4.2,
³
b γ, b Ψ
´
is a *PBESO. By construction, the output market clears at date zero. At any other date t ≥ 1,
q[wi,t (h∗)] · mi,t (h∗)=q(ω(1)) · mH
1 (h∗)=q(ω(1)) ·
ps·D(ps)
r = D(ps)=D(pt).T h e n ,t h e r ei sa nI E .
Case (ii): P(a0) · D(P(a0)) <
ps·D(ps)
r
Let yt = a0 and
yt+1 =
(
P(yt) · D(P(yt)) if P(yt) · D(P(yt)) <
ps·D(ps)









Let τ be the ﬁrst date t such that yt ≥
ps·D(ps)
r . Clearly, τ ≥ 1 because a0 <
ps·D(ps)
r .I s h o w t h a t τ is




· yt−1 ≥ r · yt−1 because
yt−1 ≤
pr·D(pr)
r implies that P(yt−1) ≥ pr. It follows that yt ≥ rt·a0 which implies that yt →∞ , a contradiction.
Thus, τ is ﬁnite. Let Ts = τ and P be the sequence with pt = P(yt) for all t<T s, pt = ps for all t ≥ Ts and with







· yTs−1 = D(p).S i n c eyt <
pr·D(pr)
r for all t<T s, then pt >p r for all
t<T s. To prove that P ∈ Σ, I shall show that pTs−1 is well deﬁned and pTs−1 >p r.
By deﬁnition of Ts, yTs−1 <
ps·D(ps)
r . Suppose yTs−1 <
pr·D(pr)
r .T h e nP(yTs−1) · D(P(yTs−1)) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r
and by Lemma A.4 pTs−1 is well deﬁned, pTs−1 >p s ≥ pr and b δ =
ps·D(ps)





b δ · pTs−1
´i







>p s · q(ω(1)) = r. Suppose yTs−1 ≥
pr·D(pr)


















D(ps) for all yTs−1 <
ps·D(ps)












b δ · pTs−1
´i















· yTs−1 >p r · D(pr) ≥
ps·D(ps)
r , where the
last inequality holds because pr ≥
ps
r and D(pr) >D(ps). Hence, b δ =
ps·D(ps)
r·pTs−1·D(pTs−1) ∈ [0,1].




b δ · pTs−1
´i
>r . By Proposition 4.2, for b δ
and T = Ts − 1,
³
b γ, b Ψ
´
is a *PBESO. Finally, I shall show that the output market clears at every t ≥ 0.S i n c e
mH
0 (h∗)=a0 = y0 and mH




· at−1 = P(at−1) · D(P(at−1)),t h e nmH
t (h∗)=yt











· yt = D(pt) ∀0 ≤ t<T s − 1


























· yTs−1 = D(pTs−1)
Finally, at any date t ≥ Ts, qH
t (h∗)=q[ω(1)] · mH
Ts (h∗)=q[ω(1)] ·
ps·D(ps)
r = D(ps) as desired.




e γ, e Ψ
´o
for some e δ ∈ [0,1] and e T ≥ e Ts.L e te h = h∗ (e γ).




















r . It follows that e pt = pt for all t ≤ T − 2.S i n c e e pt = ps = pt for all t ≥ e T then e P 6= P if and
only if there exists T − 1 ≤ t ≤ e T − 1 such that e pt 6= ps and e pt ≥ pr. From the construction of the price

















































= pr.S i n c epr · D(pr) ≥
psD(ps)





































































<p s · q[ω(1)] = r. Therefore,
³
e γ, e Ψ
´
























= ω(1) for every i ∈ I which implies that e pt = ps = pt for all t ≥ T. Hence e P = P.


















h T−1 (h∗) <
psD(ps)
r .S i n c ee δ =
psD(ps)
r·h p h T−1·D(h p h T−1) and e δ ≤ 1,t h e n










e δ · e ph T−1
´´






























































∀t ≥ 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6.2: By Proposition 3.7, it follows that i ∈ IL and for every j ∈ IH, wi,t (h∗)=
wL (pt) <ω H (pt)=wj,t (h∗) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. ¥
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